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Dominicus Gundissalinus is a peculiar figure in the twelfth-century cultural 
landscape. Born in the Iberian Peninsula between 1115 and 1125, he received 
his philosophical education in Chartres possibly under Thierry of Chartres 
and William of Conches as many traces in his original productions indicate1. 
At least since 1148, Gundissalinus was archdeacon of Cuéllar, a village not far 
from Segovia, where supposedly he was resident until 11612. Then, he moved to 
Toledo, where he was based from 1162. This fact is to be linked to the presence, 
in the Castilian town, of the Jewish philosopher Abraham ibn Daud. As pointed 
out by Bertolacci3, Ibn Daud’s translation of the prologue to Avicenna’s Liber 
sufficientiae — i.e., the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ — is to be seen as an invitation to the 
Toledan archbishop, John II, to sponsor and support a series of translations 
into Latin of Avicenna’s work. As a result, Gundissalinus arrived in Toledo, his 
presence probably required there by the same archbishop with the purpose of 
collaborating with Ibn Daud on the ‘Avicenna project’, the first accomplishment 
of which was the Latin translation of Avicenna’s De anima, realized before 11664.
1 Cf. N. HäriNg, Thierry of Chartres and Dominicus Gundissalinus, « Mediaeval Studies », 26, 1964, 
pp. 271-286 ; K. M. Fredborg, The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres, Pontifical 
Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto 1988 ; ead., The Dependence of Petrus Helias’ Summa super 
Priscianum on William of Conches’ Glosae super Priscianum, « Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge 
grec et latin », 11, 1973, pp. 1-57 ; a. Fidora, Le débat sur la création : Guillaume de Conches, maître de 
Dominique Gundisalvi ?, in b. obrist, i. Caiazzo eds., Guillaume de Conches : Philosophie et science au XII 
siècle, SISMEL - Edizioni del Galluzzo, Firenze 2011, pp. 271-288 ; N. PolloNi, Thierry of Chartres and 
Gundissalinus on Spiritual Substance : The Problem of Hylomorphic Composition, « Bulletin de Philosophie 
Médiévale », 57, 2015, pp. 35-57 ; and id., Elementi per una biografia di Dominicus Gundisalvi, « Archives 
d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littèraire du Moyen Âge », 82, 2015, pp. 7-22.
2 See l. M. Villar garCía, Documentación medieval de la Catedral de Segovia (1115-1300), Universidad 
de Salamanca, Salamanca 1990, p. 109, n. 61.
3 a. bertolaCCi, A Community of Translators. The Latin Medieval Versions of Avicenna’s Book of the 
Cure, in C. J. Mews, J. N. Crossley eds., Communities of Learning. Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual 
Identity in Europe 1100-1500, Brepols, Turnhout 2011, pp. 37-54.
4 The translation of De anima, indeed, is accompanied by a dedicatory letter to John II, who 
died in 1166 : for this reason, there is no doubt that the terminus ante quem of this translation is to 
be found in that year and, consequently, that the De anima is the first complete translation of a 
work by Avicenna realised in Toledo by Gundissalinus. See also N. PolloNi, The Toledan Translation 
Movement and Gundissalinus : Some Remarks on His Activity and Presence in Castile, in y. beale-riVaya, J. 
busiC eds., Companion to Medieval Toledo. Shared Common Places (Toledo, 711-1517), forthcoming.
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Gundissalinus remained in Toledo until 1181, the year in which he 
supposedly finished his work as translator and left the Castilian town5. After 
that date, indeed, he probably returned to Segovia, where he is attested in 
1190 participating at the cathedral chapter, the last witness we have to his life. 
During the twenty years Gundissalinus spent in Toledo, he worked on the Latin 
translation of approximately twenty works, made by working in tandem with 
Ibn Daud and Johannes Hispanus6. 
The translations were realized in a biphasic process of verbal rendering of 
the Arabic into Iberian Vernacular and then from Vernacular into written Latin7. 
Naturally Gundissalinus was responsible of the second part of this process, while 
Ibn Daud and Johannes Hispanus were dedicated to the first part. Some passages 
of Gundissalinus’s original writings, where the author presents calques of 
excerpts from the Arabic sources different from the Latin translations, seem to 
indicate that Gundissalinus, at least in a later period of his life, learned Arabic8.
The translations realised by Gundissalinus have some peculiarities in 
comparison to the work by Gerard of Cremona. While the latter worked on an 
evidently larger number of translations, with a variety of authors and disciplines 
5 M. aloNso aloNso, Notas sobre los traductores toledanos Domingo Gundisalvo y Juan Hispano, « al-
Andalus », 8, 1943 pp. 155-188.
6 See d. N. Hasse, a. büttNer, Notes on Anonymous Twelfth-Century Translations of Philosophical Texts 
from Arabic into Latin on the Iberian Peninsula, in D. N. Hasse, a. bertolaCCi eds., The Arabic, Hebrew, and 
Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Physics and Cosmology, Berlin - Boston 2017, forthcoming.
7 See M.-t. d’alVerNy, Les traductions à deux interprètes, d’arabe en langue vernaculaire et de langue 
vernaculaire en latin, in g. CoNtaMiNe ed., Traduction et traducteurs au Moyen Âge. Actes du colloque 
international du CNRS organisée à Paris, Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes, les 26-28 mai 1986, 
Éditions du CNRS, Paris 1989, pp. 193-206 ; C. burNett, Literal Translation and Intelligent Adaptation 
amongst the Arabic-Latin Translators of the First Half of the Twelfth Century, in b. M. sCarCia aMoretti 
ed., La diffusione delle scienze islamiche nel Medio Evo Europeo, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 
1987, pp. 9-28 ; and C. burNett, Translating from Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages : Theory, Practice, 
and Criticism, in s. g. loFts, P. w. roseMaNN eds., Éditer, traduire, interpreter : essais de méthodologie 
philosophique, Peeters, Louvain 1997, pp. 55-78.
 8 This possibility seems to be corroborated by some textual traces suggesting that 
Gundissalinus used the original Arabic text of Avicenna’s Ilāhiyyāt. See N. PolloNi, Aristotle in Toledo : 
Gundissalinus, the Arabs, and Gerard of Cremona’s Translations, in C. burNett, P. MaNtas eds., ‘Ex Oriente 
Lux’. Translating Words, Scripts and Styles in the Medieval Mediterranean World, CNERU, Córdoba 2016 
(Arabica Veritas, IV), pp. 147-185. This could explain the authorship, attested by the manuscript 
tradition, of some Latin translations to Gundissalinus alone : and the acquisition of Arabic is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition to state this point. The attributions of the Latin 
manuscripts, indeed, should not be taken as a proof of Gundissalinus’s knowledge of Arabic, since 
the name of the translating collaborator could have been missed by the tradition. In this way, new 
examinations of the tradition of every single work translated by Gundissalinus should be made 
at some point in the future, in order to clarify this point, together with an overall analysis of the 
different textual versions of the excerpts presented by Gundissalinus in his original production.
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(from philosophy to geomancy), Gundissalinus worked only on philosophical 
texts and those mostly of Arabic authors, both Islamic and Jewish. In this respect, 
Avicenna plays a key role among the translations produced by Gundissalinus, 
since he worked on the Latin translation of the De anima, Liber de philosophia prima, 
the first three books of the Physica, parts of the Isagoge and Posterior Analytics, 
excerpts from Meteora, the De medicinis cordialibus, and the pseudo-Avicennian 
Liber celi et mundi. All of these texts, in interconnection with further Latin and 
Arabic sources, mainly Ibn Gabirol and al-Fārābī, have a specific textual and 
doctrinal influence on Gundissalinus’s original philosophical production.
Avicenna is the author who, for the number of writings translated and their 
complexity, would in many respects define Gundissalinus’s Toledan work as 
translator and philosopher. In this connection Abraham ibn Daud’s position as a 
convinced Avicennist, who had first-hand knowledge of Arabic philosophy should 
be recalled. Ibn Daud supplied, probably, the organisation and made decisions as to 
what texts were to be translated. Furthermore, and even more importantly, it was 
he who interpreted the texts in the Arabic-into-Vernacular part of the biphasic 
translating method adopted in Toledo. The role played by the Jewish philosopher 
is pivotal, and Ibn Daud influenced also Gundissalinus’s original philosophical 
productions, especially though his criticism of Ibn Gabirol’s ontology9. 
Traditionally, six original writings have been attributed to Gundissalinus : 
De unitate et uno10, De scientiis11, De immortalitate animae12, De anima13, De divisione 
philosophiae14, and De processione mundi15. The list of Gundissalinus’s works, 
9 Cf. N. PolloNi, Glimpses of the Invisible : Doctrines and Sources of Dominicus Gundissalinus’ Meta-
physics, forthcoming.
10 guNdissaliNus, De unitate et uno, ed. P. CorreNs, Die dem Boethius fälschlich zugeschriebene 
Abhandlung des Dominicus Gundisalvi De unitate, « Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und 
Theologie des Mittelalters », 1/1, 1891, pp. 3-11 ; guNdissaliNus, El Liber de unitate et uno, ed. M. aloNso 
aloNso, « Pensamiento », 12, 1956, pp. 69-77 ; and guNdissaliNus, De unitate et uno, ed. M. J. soto 
bruNa, C. aloNso del real, De unitate et uno de Dominicus Gundissalinus, EUNSA, Pamplona 2015.
11 guNdissaliNus, De scientiis, ed. M. aloNso aloNso, Editorial Maestre, Madrid - Granada 1954.
12 guNdissaliNus, De immortalitate animae, ed. g. bülow, Des Dominicus Gundissalinus Schrift Von 
der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, « Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters », 2/3, 1897, 
pp. 1-38.
13 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. J. t. MuCKle, The Treatise De anima of Dominicus Gundissalinus, 
« Mediaeval Studies », 2, 1940, pp. 23-103 ; and guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. C. aloNso del real, M. J. 
soto bruNa, El Tractatvs de anima atribuido a Dominicvs Gvundi[s]salinvs, EUNSA, Pamplona 2009.
14 guNdissaliNus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. l. baur, « Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie 
und Theologie des Mittelalters », 4/2, 1903, pp. 3-142.
15 guNdissaliNus, De processione mundi, ed. G. bülow, Des Dominicus Gundissalinus Schrift Von dem 
Hervorgange der Welt, « Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters », 
24/3, 1925, pp. 1-56 ; and d. guNdissaliNus, De processione mundi, ed. M. J. soto bruNa, C. aloNso del real, 
De processione mundi. Estudio y edición crítica del tratado de D. Gundisalvo, EUNSA, Pamplona 1999.
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nevertheless, has undergone a certain degree of reassessment in the last six 
decades, as a consequence of the problematization of the manuscript tradition. 
In the first place, at least one further work should be added to the list, that is, the 
Liber mahameleth whose production is directly related to Gundissalinus’s circle 
as pointed out by Charles Burnett and the editor of the text, A. M. Vlasschaert16. 
The Liber mahameleth is a peculiar treatise which deals mainly with the practical 
application of arithmetical and algebraic operation to everyday life, with a 
specific interest in commerce. Nonetheless, since this writing does not have 
a philosophical nature, and its author is to have been amongst the members 
of the ‘Gundissalinus’s circle’ and, perhaps, not Gundissalinus himself, it will 
not be considered in the present analysis. Another work that is to be linked 
to Gundissalinus’s team is, with all probability, the anonymous treatise On the 
Peregrination of the Soul in the Afterlife discovered by d’Alverny : this work is 
dependent on Gundissalinus’s writings in a very peculiar way, but since the 
authorship of this writing has not been demonstrated yet, the Peregrinatio will 
not be discussed here either17.
The attribution of the De immortalitate animae to Gundissalinus has also 
been called into question. The hypothesis of a different authorship, rather 
than the Toledan philosopher, is rooted on the twofold manuscript tradition 
of this treatise, that ascribes the work to both Gundissalinus and William of 
Auvergne. While the critical editor, Bülow, produced a stemma codicum which 
claims Gundissalinus’s authorship, some scholars, particularly, A. Masnovo and 
B. Allard18, have criticised this attribution (and the stemma codicum), proposing 
William as the author of the De immortalitate animae. Even though further data 
seem to oppose this last hypothesis, I shall not consider the treatise as a work 
by Gundissalinus.
Finally, the specific problems arising from the consideration of Gundissalinus’s 
De scientiis should be underlined. In this respect, there is no doubt about the 
attribution : the author is Gundissalinus. The problem, nonetheless, resides on 
16 See Le Liber mahamaleth, critical edition by a. M. VlassCHaert, Steiner, Stuttgart 2010 ; and 
Liber mahamelet, critical edition by J. sesiaNo, Springer, Berlin 2014.
17 M.-T. d’alVerNy, Les pérégrinations de l’âme dans l’autre monde d’après un anonyme de la fine du 
XIIe siècle, « Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge », 13, 1940-1942, pp. 280-299.
18 See a. MasNoVo, Da Guglielmo d’Auvergne a san Tommaso d’Aquino, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1945-
6, pp. 119-123 ; b. allard, Note sur le De immortalitate animae de Guillaume d’Auvergne, « Bulletin de 
philosophie médiévale », 18, 1976, pp. 68-72 ; and id., Nouvelles additions et corrections au Répertoire 
de Glorieux : à propos de Guillaume d’Auvergne, « Bulletin de philosophie médiévale », 10-12, 1968-
70, pp. 79-80.
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the stylistic and, consequently, epistemic nature of the De scientiis. The work is, 
essentially, a Latin version of al-Farabi’s Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm. Gerard of Cremona 
produced a literal and comprehensive Latin translation of this Farabian work19. 
In comparison to Gerard’s version, Gundissalinus’s De scientiis presents a wide 
degree of textual and doctrinal alteration, for Gundissalinus cuts many passages 
he did not agree with, modifies other parts of the text, and in general re-shapes 
the whole writing into something that has a hybrid literary statute, for it is neither 
a pure translation nor an actual original writing. All the same, the problems 
regarding the status of the De scientiis does not affect the present study since 
there is no substantial influence of Avicenna in this writing, textual or doctrinal.
A reliable attribution to Gundissalinus’s authorship can be stated, therefore, 
for four philosophical writings : De unitate et uno, De anima, De divisione philosophiae 
and De processione mundi. In these four texts is condensed Gundissalinus’s attempt 
to renovate the Latin discussion on three main topics : psychology, epistemology 
and metaphysics, and in all these three aspects, Avicenna plays a primary role. 
Gundissalinus’s De anima tries to give an overall account of the soul, from 
the problem of its origins, to its powers and its knowledge once separated 
from the body. In doing so, Gundissalinus uses mainly three sources : Qusta ibn 
Luqa’s Differentia animae et spiritus, Avicenna’s De anima, and Ibn Gabirol’s Fons 
vitae, which are accompanied by a number of Latin authorities, amongst whom 
Augustine features. This syncretic tendency to melt together different traditions 
and perspectives is even stronger in the epistemological treatise De divisione 
philosophiae. This treatise, as the title suggests, is focused on the articulation 
of knowledge. Gundissalinus’s purpose in writing on the overall articulation 
of knowledge entails the use of a vast number of sources on which a complete 
epistemological system could, and should, be based. 
Furthermore, Gundissalinus dedicates two treatises to metaphysics, the De 
unitate et uno and De processione mundi. The De unitate is short : Gundissalinus 
discusses almost exclusively the theme of Oneness, and then, the metaphysical 
difference between pure Unity and derived unity. The main source, here, is 
Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, from which Gundissalinus took, besides the doctrine of 
universal hylomorphism, Ibn Gabirol’s cosmological progression. These features 
are joined to Boethius’s authority stating that « quicquid est, ideo est, quia 
19 See al-Fārābī, Über die Wissenschaften / De scientiis : Nach der lateinischen Übersetzung Gerhards 
von Cremona, ed. F. sCHuPP, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2005.
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unum est »20 a kind of thematic refrain in the De unitate. In the De processione 
mundi, written after the De unitate, Gundissalinus presents his own cosmological 
synthesis, and tries to resolve some of the most controversial problems discussed 
in his time by a Timaeus-based viewpoint basically using Avicenna’s and Ibn 
Gabirol’s ontologies. 
tHe textual PreseNCe oF aViCeNNa iN guNdissaliNus’s worKs
Gundissalinus makes a wide use of Avicenna’s writing, presented through 
quotations and implicit references to his works. Nonetheless, Gundissalinus 
pursues a kind of alteration strategy while quoting Avicenna and his other Arabic 
sources21. Gundissalinus’s relation with his Arabic sources is marked by a peculiar 
twofold approach. The Toledan philosopher is, at one and the same time, a 
translator from Arabic into Latin, and the translator of many of the sources 
upon which he bases his own philosophical reflection. From this perspective, 
the traditional problem of the interpretative freedom of the translator — or 
better, the hermeneutical stratification to which the translated text is exposed 
— finds a particular outcome. Gundissalinus interprets the original text while 
translating it into Latin, and then, he re-interprets the same text when he uses 
(and quotes) it in his original production. And since Gundissalinus’s works are 
for the most part collationes of quotations, whose text only rarely corresponds 
literally to that of the sources he is quoting, the recognition of this discrepancy 
offers a thorny problem to the scholarship dealing with Gundissalinus. 
In the first place, Gundissalinus’s use of his sources is marked by blind 
quotations. In the De processione mundi alone, there are more than one hundred 
direct quotations of excerpts derived from Arabic and Latin authors, and 
none of them makes explicit reference to its original source. On the contrary, 
Gundissalinus inserts on some occasions false references to Aristotle, while 
quoting other authors, especially Avicenna22. For example, in the De anima, 
when Gundissalinus states that :
« Ex his igitur manifestum est quod cum nec vita nec una perfectionum sive 
bonitatum retenta sit apud primum principium in prima genitura, sicut 
Aristoteles dixit, tamen non omne corpus est receptibile vitae quia caret 
aptitudine recipiendi eam »23.
20 guNdissaliNus, De unitate et uno, ed. CorreNs, p. 3, 8-9
21 Cf. N. PolloNi, Gundissalinus on Necessary Being : Textual and Doctrinal Alterations in the Exposition 
of Avicenna’s Metaphysics, « Arabic Sciences and Philosophy », 26/1, 2016, pp. 129-160.
22 Cf. PolloNi, Aristotle in Toledo : Gundissalinus, the Arabs, and Gerard of Cremona’s Translations cit.
23 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, p. 116, 9-13.
SI
SM
EL
. E
DI
ZI
O
N
I D
EL
 G
AL
LU
ZZ
O
gundissalinus and avicenna 521
He is actually quoting a passage from Avicenna’s De medicinis cordialibus, 
where Gundissalinus could read :
« Nec vita nec ulla perfectionum aut bonitatum est retenta apud primum 
principium in prima genitura, sed receptibilia quandoque sunt carentia 
aptitudine recipienti ea ... »24.
This is just one example of Gundissalinus’s attitude towards the quotations he 
makes and the references which accompany them. It should be added to this that 
Gundissalinus’s most common stylistic manoeuvre is to isolate sentences from 
the context of the original source and integrate them in a new context, often 
composed of a variety of isolated quoted sentences, whose horizon of meaning is 
sensibly different from the original. On some occasions, the purpose of quoting 
such short sentences, without displaying any relevant content, is completely 
unclear. On other occasions, this attitude corresponds to Gundissalinus’s 
attempt to produce a theoretical synthesis between doctrinal cores he perceived 
as opposite to each other. 
Not all the quotations presented by Gundissalinus, though, are short or 
melded with other textual sources. In some occasions, and basically when using 
materials from Avicenna’s works, Gundissalinus quotes large excerpts, even 
entire chapters. The length of these excerpts is directly related to the theoretical 
relevance they have in Gundissalinus’s work, that is, the doctrinal role played 
by Avicenna’s quotations in three works : De processione mundi, De anima, and De 
divisione philosophiae. Leaving aside the De immortalitate animae, whose authorship 
is still dubious, and the De scientiis, which is a ‘creative translation’ of al-Fārābī’s 
Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, one should mention the reasons for the absence of Avicenna 
from the one treatise left, the De unitate et uno, before passing on to analyse his 
presence in the other three works.
Gundissalinus’s De unitate is with all probability one of the first works he 
wrote. It is almost completely dependent on Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, with little 
influence from other sources and an even less critical attitude toward the 
implicit consequences of Ibn Gabirol’s cosmological system and ontology. In this 
rather short treatise, though, there seems to be at least one trace of Avicenna, 
namely in the following passage, where Gundissalinus discusses the different 
ways by which one can understand composed unity :
24 aViCeNNa, De medicine cordialibus, critical edition by s. VaN riet, in aViCeNNa, Liber de anima seu 
sextus de naturalibus, 2 vols., Peeters - Brill, Louvain - Leiden 1982, vol. II, p. 188, 9-14.
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« Alia dicuntur unum aggregatione, ut populus et grex, congeries lapidum vel 
acervus tritici. Alia dicuntur proportione unum, ut rector navis et gubernator 
civitatis dicuntur unum similitudine officii »25.
This passage appears be derived from Avicenna’s Liber de philosophia prima, 
also translated by Gundissalinus. In book III, chapter 2, while discussing the 
same topic, Avicenna states that :
« Unum autem aequalitate est comparatio aliqua, sicut hoc quod comparatio 
navis ad rectorem et civitatis ad regem una est : hae enim duae comparationes 
consimiles sunt, nec est earum unitio per accidens, sed est unitas quaedam in 
qua uniuntur per accidens, unitas navis et civitatis, et per illas est unitas per 
accidens ; unitas enim duarum dispositionum non est unitas quam posuimus 
unitatem per accidens »26.
Gundissalinus — if he is dependent on the Liber de philosophia prima — sensibly 
simplifies Avicenna’s line of reasoning. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that 
the two passages display a crucial lexicographical difference : while Avicenna’s 
text refers to rector and rex as the two beings forming this kind of unity, the De 
unitate uses the terms rector and gubernator. Now, since the original Arabic text 
of the Liber de philosophia prima reads ‘wa-ḥāl al-madīna ʿinda l-malik wāḥida’, thus 
the correct Latin rendering should be rex. There are many possible explanations 
for this inconsistency between the two excerpts, and possibly Gundissalinus had 
a mediated access to this passage (admitting that it is the actual source) thanks to 
Abraham ibn Daud. For the absence of any further quotations and, especially, of 
any doctrinal influence of Avicenna on the De unitate et uno, it could be supposed 
that the Liber de philosophia prima still had to be translated into Latin. Indeed, 
the De processione mundi, written after the De unitate, offers a more profound 
reception of Avicenna’s metaphysics.
As for textual quotations, the De processione mundi presents at least two direct 
quotations of works by Avicenna, extremely different to each other. The first 
quotation presented by Gundissalinus27 covers almost entirely chapter 6 and 7 
of the first book of the Liber de philosophia prima28. Through this Gundissalinus 
expounds Avicenna’s demonstrations of the unrelated Oneness of the Necessary 
Existent, and the very doctrine of necessary and possible being upon which 
25  guNdissaliNus, De unitate et uno, ed. CorreNs, p. 9, 20-23
26  aViCeNNa, Liber de philosophia prima, critical edition by s. VaN riet, Peeters, Louvain 1977, 
p. 113, 95-01.
27 guNdissaliNus, De processione mundi, ed. bülow, pp. 5, 15 - 16, 22.
28 aViCeNNa, Liber de philosophia prima, ed. VaN riet, pp. 43, 21 - 55, 55.
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Gundissalinus’s overall ontology is based on the De processione. This vast and dense 
quotation offers also a flavour of Gundissalinus’s alteration strategy through which 
the very quotations are inserted on the newly produced writing29. The textual 
comparison between the two excerpts reveals Gundissalinus’s creative spirit, 
through which he modifies the quoted text in different ways and basically by :
• changing the order of the paragraphs ;
• subtly modifying the lexicon used ;
• altering Avicenna’s line of reasoning on at least one occasion30.
It should be supposed that, by changing the quoted text in this manifold 
way, Gundissalinus is aiming at a specific purpose or purposes. In the first place, 
Gundissalinus’s concern regarding the consistency of the theoretical outcomes 
of the writing he is working on should be assumed. The insertion of any quoted 
excerpt must meet some implicit criteria of consistency with the overall writing 
on which it is presented, and in particular, with the other texts quoted by 
Gundissalinus. This concern might be the origin of Gundissalinus’s change of 
parts of the quoted passage. Moreover — and this is eminently displayed by 
Gundissalinus’s De scientiis — the Toledan philosopher could have disagreed with 
some passages of the source he is using, and thus could have preferred to cut 
those passages while quoting the source (or translating it, in the case of the 
De scientiis). Furthermore, Gundissalinus, in this case, is quoting a work he has 
translated into Latin. Some factors could be in play in such a dynamic. First, 
Gundissalinus could find his previous translation as not completely satisfactory 
anymore, and then re-translate the text from the Arabic while quoting. Or 
probably Gundissalinus is engaged in polishing his previous Latin translation 
while quoting the text in his original writing. 
29 It is extremely important to stress, here, that the textual comparison between two medieval 
versions of the same work (or, in this case, two version of the same excerpt) has to be structurally 
problematized by taking into account the possible corruption of the transmission of the text. That 
is to say, the simple comparison between critical edited texts is not sufficient for asserting the 
voluntary modification of lexical or even doctrinal elements. For this reason, while the recognition 
of some voluntary alterations by Gundissalinus is patent (for example, the change in the order of 
the paragraphs of the quoted text, or the modification of doctrinal passages in order to make the 
quoted text consistent with Gundissalinus’s writing where it is presented), not every difference 
between the text of the source and the quoted text should be considered a voluntary alteration. 
See PolloNi, Gundissalinus on Necessary Being cit.
30 For an overall analysis of these alterations, see PolloNi, Gundissalinus on Necessary Being cit. The 
appendix to the article (pp. 149-160) also presents a textual comparison between the two versions 
of these passages in Avicenna’s Liber de philosophia prima and Gundissalinus’s De processione mundi.
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The De processione mundi offers another direct quotation of a work written by 
Avicenna, this time from the Physica. While discussing the doctrine of universal 
hylomorphism — possibly the most important point of Gundissalinus’s ontology 
— the Toledan philosopher states :
« Ex hoc enim, quod est in potentia receptibilis formarum, vocatur yle, et ex hoc, 
quod iam in actu est sustinens formam, subiectum vocatur. Sed non sicut in logica 
subiectum accipitur, cum substantia describitur. Yle enim non est subiectum hoc 
modo, sed est subiecta formae, et ex hoc, quod est communis omnibus formis, 
vocatur vel massa vel materia ; et ex hoc, quod alia resolvuntur in illam, quoniam 
ipsa est simplex pars omnis compositi, vocatur elementum, quemadmodum et in 
aliis. Et ex hoc, quod ab illa incipit compositio, vocatur origo ; sed cum incipitur a 
composito, et pervenitur ad illam, vocatur elementum »31. 
This passage is a direct quotation of Avicenna’s Physica, book I, translated by 
Gundissalinus, and which reads :
« Et haec hyle, secundum hoc quod est in potentia receptibilis formae aut 
formarum, vocatur hyle et, secundum hoc quod est in actu sustinens formam, 
vocatur subiectum. Non autem hic accipimus subiectum sicut in logica quando 
definiebatur substantia, quia hyle non est subiectum ex hoc intellectu ullo modo 
et, secundum hoc quod est communis omnibus formatis, vocatur materia vel massa 
et, secundum hoc quod resolvuntur in illa et est ipsa pars simplex receptibilis 
formae totius compositi, vocatur elementum. Similiter etiam quicquid est sicut 
illud et secundum hoc quod ab illa incipit compositio, vocatur origo ; similiter 
etiam quicquid est aliud quod est sicut illa : fortasse enim, quando incipitur ab 
ea, vocatur origo, quando autem incipitur a compositio et pervenitur ad illam, 
vocatur elementum quia elementum est simplicior pars compositi »32.
Gundissalinus’s quotation displays a certain degree of simplification of the 
original text, from both a syntactical and doctrinal point of view. All the same, 
it should be noticed that the Avicennian excerpt is surrounded, in the receiving 
writing, by a conspicuous number of direct quotations of Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, 
making of this passage from the Physica a kind of explanatory addendum of 
universal hylomorphism. 
A similar use of Avicennian materials can be detected in Gundissalinus’s 
epistemological treatise De divisione philosophiae. This work, too, presents a wide 
31 guNdissaliNus, De processione mundi, ed. bülow, p. 31, 6-16.
32 aViCeNNa, Liber primus naturalium. Tractatus primus de causis et principiis naturalium, critical 
edition by S. VaN riet, Peeters - Brill, Louvain - Leiden 1992, pp. 21, 60 - 22, 72.
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number of blind quotations from many writings of the Arabic and Latin traditions, 
quotes melded together in a similar fashion to the De processione mundi. The role 
played by Avicenna in the De divisione philosophiae is crucial also, since Gundissalinus’s 
division of the sciences is rooted on the Avicennian theory of subalternation. As for 
the De processione, the main doctrinal task is pursued by Gundissalinus through the 
quotation of a large excerpt that, in the economy of the De divisione, takes the title 
Summa Avicennae de convenientia et differentia subiectorum33, or perhaps from a more 
accurately philological point of view, as proposed by J. Janssens, Summa Avicennae 
de convenientia et differentia scientiarum praedictarum34.
This large quotation presents Avicenna’s doctrine of subalternation and 
its value is pivotal, for this passage grounds, explains, and justifies the overall 
discussion presented by the Toledan philosopher in the De divisione. Another 
important factor to consider is that the Summa Avicennae is a Latin translation of 
chapter seven of the second part of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān, from the Šifāʾ’s 
book on logic : the only extant Latin translation of this writing. In this case, the 
remarks made above regarding Gundissalinus’s aim at polishing and adapting 
his previous translation of the quoted text cannot be repeated : it is not known 
whether the quotation from Kitāb al-Burhān was preceded by a non-extant 
translation of the whole writing by Gundissalinus or not, even though it does 
not seem to be the case
Gundissalinus’s De divisione philosophiae displays further quotations from 
Avicenna’s works, mainly derived from the Liber de philosophia prima. A striking 
example of the textual influence of this writing on the De divisione is provided 
by Gundissalinus’s discussion of metaphysics as first philosophy, about which 
he claims :
« Multis modis haec scientia vocatur. Dicitur enim ‘scientia divina’ a digniori 
parte, quia ipsa de Deo inquirit, an sit, et probat, quod sit. Dicitur ‘philosophia 
prima’, quia ipsa est scientia de prima causa esse. Dicitur etiam ‘causa causarum’, 
quia in ea agitur de Deo, qui est causa omnium. Dicitur etiam ‘metaphysica’, i.e. 
‘post physicam’, quia ipsa est de eo, quod est post naturam. Intelligitur autem hic 
33 guNdissaliNus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. baur, pp. 124, 5 - 133, 24.
34 Cf. J. JaNsseNs, Le De divisione philosophiae de Gundissalinus : quelques remarques préliminaires 
à une édition critique, in e. Coda, C. MartiNi boNadeo eds., De l’antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge : études de 
logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-
Roche, Vrin, Paris 2014, pp. 559-570. See also H. HugoNNard roCHe, La classification des sciences de 
Gundissalinus et l’influence d’Avicenne, in J. JoliVet, r. rasHed eds., Études sur Avicenne, Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris 1984, pp. 41-75, ivi 42.
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natura virtus, quae est principium motus et quietis : immo est virtus et principium 
universorum accidentium, quae proveniunt ex materia corporali. Unde, quia 
haec scientia dicitur ‘post naturam’, haec posteritas non est quantum in se, sed 
quantum ad nos. Primum enim, quod percipimus de eo, quod est, et scimus eius 
dispositiones, natura est ; unde quod meretur vocari haec scientia considerata in 
se, hoc est, ut dicatur, quod est scientia de eo, quod est ante naturam. Ea enim, 
de quibus inquiritur in illa, per essentiam et per scientiam sunt ante naturam »35.
This passage is textually based on two passages, at least, of the first book 
of Avicenna’s Liber de philosophia prima : Avicenna’s discussion of philosophia 
prima as science of the cause of being36 (second chapter) of which Gundissalinus 
cuts any reference to metaphysics as the science of ‘ens inquantum est ens’ —  ; 
and Avicenna’s remarks on the priority or posterity of metaphysics in itself 
and for us (third chapter)37. This influence appears to be even stronger when 
considering Gundissalinus’s further definitions of metaphysics as ‘scientia de 
rebus separatis a materia definitione’38 ; ‘philosophia certissima et prima’39 ; 
‘sapientia certissima’40 ; and ‘sapientia’41. 
35 guNdissaliNus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. baur, p. 38, 7-23.
36 aViCeNNa, Liber de philosophia prima, ed. VaN riet, pp. 15, 86 - 16, 1 : « Igitur quaestiones huius 
scientiae quaedam sunt causae esse, inquantum est esse causatum, et quaedam sunt accidentalia 
esse, et quaedam sunt principia scientiarum singularum. Et scientia horum quaeritur in hoc 
magisterio. Et haec est philosophia prima, quia ipsa est scientia de prima causa esse, et haec est 
prima causa, sed prima causa universitatis est esse et unitas ; et est etiam sapientia quae est nobilior 
scientia qua apprehenditur nobilius scitum : nobilior vero scientia, quia est certitudo veritatis, et 
nobilius scitum, quia est Deus, et causae quae sunt post eum ; et etiam cognitio causarum ultimarum 
omnis esse, et cognitio Dei, et propterea definitur scientia divina sic quod est scientia de rebus 
separatis a materia definitione et definitionibus, quia ens, inquantum est ens, et principia eius et 
accidentalia eius, inquantum sunt, sicut iam patuit, nullum eorum est nisi praecedens materiam 
nec pendet esse eius ex esse illius. Cum autem inquiritur in hac scientia de eo quod non praecedit 
materiam, non inquiritur in ea nisi secundum hoc quod eius esse non eget materia ».
37 aViCeNNa, Liber de philosophia prima, ed. VaN riet, pp. 24, 45 - 25, 57 : « Nomen vero huius 
scientiae est quod ipsa est de eo quod est post naturam. Intelligitur autem natura virtus quae est 
principium motus et quietis, immo et universitatis eorum accidentium quae proveniunt ex materia 
corporali est virtus. Iam autem dictum est quod natura est corporis naturalis quod habet naturam. 
Corpus vero naturale est corpus sensibile cum eo quod habet de proprietatibus et accidentibus. 
Quod vero dicitur post naturam, hoc posteritas est in respectu quantum ad nos : primum enim 
quod percipimus de eo quod est et scimus eius dispositiones est hoc quod praesentatur nobis de 
hoc esse naturali. Unde quod meretur vocari haec scientia, considerata in se, hoc est ut dicatur 
quod est scientia de eo quod est ante naturam : ea enim de quibus inquiritur in hac scientia per 
essentiam et per scientiam sunt ante naturam ».
38 guNdissaliNus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. baur, p. 35, 16.
39 Ibid., p. 35, 17.
40 Ibid., p. 35, 18.
41 Ibid., pp. 35, 18 - 36, 8.
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A similar attitude toward Avicenna’s texts can be seen at work in Gundissalinus’s 
De anima, with some differences. This writing is dedicated to the discussion of 
the soul from its definition to its ontological composition, immortality, and 
psychological powers. As mentioned above, the main sources on which this work 
is based are basically three : Qusta Ibn Luqa’s De differentia spiritus et animae, Ibn 
Gabirol’s Fons vitae, and Avicenna’s De anima, which is also the main and almost 
exclusive source of the two final chapters, where Gundissalinus finally deals with 
the psychological powers of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective soul42. 
Indeed, a close consideration of these two chapters displays that Gundissalinus 
completely relies on Avicenna’s writing : the text of the treatise is developed as a 
collatio of different excerpts from Avicenna’s homonymous work, derived mostly 
from book I and V43. Nonetheless, while the presence of Avicenna’s De anima 
is wide, many of his further works seems to have influenced Gundissalinus’s 
psychological writing : a fact that can possibly be explained by the relatively 
early date of composition of Gundissalinus’s De anima. 
The works by Avicenna play, therefore, an enveloping, primary, and 
unequivocal role in the original writings of the Toledan philosopher. The 
presence of direct quotations from Avicenna’s works is vast and diffusive, 
and exceeds the exemplar cases discussed here. And through this presence, 
the doctrines and theories elaborated by Avicenna come to be crucial for 
Gundissalinus’s original speculation.
tHe doCtriNal iNFlueNCe oF aViCeNNa oN guNdissaliNus’s reFleCtioNs
Gundissalinus’s speculation is a comprehensive attempt at updating 
the philosophical debate contemporary to him through the assimilation of 
the new doctrines and sources derived by the Arabic-into-Latin translation 
movement. Gundissalinus translates, reads, studies, and sometimes criticises 
the Arabic sources he uses, and while his reflection is aimed at resolving some 
crucial problems of the Latin tradition — concerning the soul, the division of 
sciences, the constitution of reality — the temporal development of his own 
philosophical reflection is marked by some changes of perspective and doctrinal 
problematizations. By this point of view, the encounter with Avicenna is pivotal 
for Gundissalinus, and from the translation of the De anima up to that of the 
Physica, the Toledan philosopher shapes his reflections in the shadow of Avicenna.
42 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, pp. 178, 3 - 288, 14.
43 Cf. d. N. Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West. The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of 
the Soul (1160-1300), Warburg Institute, London 2000, p. 191.
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Gundissalinus’s reading of Avicenna’s works is rather different from that of 
later philosophers such as Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas. Gundissalinus 
is the first Latin philosopher to deal with Avicenna’s speculation, and from a 
perhaps ingenuous perspective. Gundissalinus is not interested in doctrines that 
will be the focus of the subsequent reception of Avicenna’s writings, such as the 
discussion of the difference between essence and existence, the perpetration of 
the species through the individuals, or the theory of the indifference of essences. 
Other doctrines toward which Gundissalinus displays a certain interest, do not 
find any real degree of problematization, as if Gundissalinus would not have 
been able to see the problems arising from the acceptation of these theories. 
One of the most renowned cases of this attitude is Gundissalinus’s acceptance of 
Avicenna’s theory of the separate active intellect44. 
In all these cases, Avicenna is the main author through whom Gundissalinus 
tries to give his own account of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. 
Through analysis of Gundissalinus’s original production, it is possible to grasp 
how Avicenna is used to resolve problems arising from Gundissalinus’s own 
adhesion to further Arabic doctrines, as, for example, his acceptance of Ibn 
Gabirol’s perspective in cosmology and ontology. 
From the consideration of the sources used, the style presented, and the cross-
textual analysis, it can be said that the De unitate et uno and the De scientiis are the 
first works to be written by Gundissalinus45. The comparison of these two works 
with Gundissalinus’s mature development of the same topics in his De processione 
mundi and De divisione philosophiae displays how relevant is the contribution 
of Avicenna to Gundissalinus’s reflections. This aspect is particularly evident 
regarding the metaphysical works written by the Toledan philosopher.
The theoretical core of the De unitate is the discussion of the metaphysical 
concept of unity and oneness : every single thing can be said to be one through 
the participation to unity, and thus, by being one, that thing can be said to be46. 
The main and almost exclusive source of Gundissalinus’s discussion of this topic 
is Solomon Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae. The debt to Ibn Gabirol’s writing is striking, 
since Gundissalinus receives and develops from the Fons vitae both the doctrine 
of universal hylomorphism and the cosmological progression of the hypostases. 
44 As we are going to see, it is extremely likely that Gundissalinus felt this doctrine as 
potentially problematic : but his solution to this arising problem will be only an entangled scheme 
of references to the traditional doctrine of illumination in order to show the consistency between 
Avicenna and the Latin tradition.
45 See PolloNi, Glimpses of the Invisible cit.
46 guNdissaliNus, De unitate et uno, ed. CorreNs, p. 3, 2-9.
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The first problem Gundissalinus has to resolve is the explanation of the 
modality through which a thing participates of unity, and this entails the 
problem of the ontological composition of the created being. Being derives from 
the form (‘omne esse ex forma est’)47, but form can cause being/existence only 
if and when it has a matter to join. Therefore, being is a consequence of the 
union of matter and form : it is the very existence of form with matter. In this 
ontological dynamic, unity is the very causal bond that keeps together matter 
and form, and thus, unity appears as the fundamental ontological factor of 
existence. It is unity, and unity only, that makes possible any hylomorphic union 
in virtue of which a thing is said to exist, and when that bond is removed, the 
thing is indeed dissolved ; it does not exist anymore48. 
The crucial role played by unity is explained by the consideration of matter. In 
itself, matter naturally tends to dispersion, its nature is to be multiplied, divided 
and fractioned. Matter, therefore, is the very contrary of unity, and because of 
this, unity is necessary in order to establish and maintain every created being, 
since only unity can hold the matter and keep it united to the form. Unity always 
accompanies matter in the hylomorphic compound : unity is the very form that 
is joined to matter, and that’s why it is said that being is caused by the form49. 
Nonetheless, the unity/form immanent to the created being is a derived unity, 
caused by the first Unity that is God. It is through God’s will that any created thing 
is one thing, and everything tends to be one and to join the One, since everything 
desire to be and they can be only by being one50. At the same time, the derived unity 
is ontologically ‘other’ than divine One. Every caused being has to be different from 
its cause, while the actual Unity is eternal, immutable and alien to any diversity, 
the derived unity had to suffer multiplicity, diversity, and mutability : the created 
unity had to be joined to matter, the principle of multiplicity and change.
47 Ibid., p. 3, 10-15 : « Omne enim esse ex forma est, in creatis scilicet. Sed nullum esse ex forma 
est, nisi cum forma materiae unita est. Esse igitur est nonnisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia. 
Unde philosophi sic describunt illud dicentes : esse est existentia formae cum materia. Cum autem 
forma materiae unitur, ex coniunctione utriusque necessario aliquid unum constituitur ».
48 Ibid., p. 4, 8-11 : « Quapropter sicut unitate res ad esse ducitur, sic et unitate in illo esse 
custoditur. Unde esse et unum inseparabiliter concomitantur se et videntur esse simul natura ».
49 Ibid., p. 5, 10-12 : « Ac per hoc unitas per se retinet materiam. Sed quod per se retinet, non 
potest facere separationem. Forma ergo existens in materia, quae perficit et custodit essentiam 
cuiusque rei, unitas est descendens a prima unitate, quae creavit eam ».
50 Ibid., p. 4, 12-120 : « Quia enim creator vere unus est, ideo rebus, quas condidit in hoc 
numero, dedit, ut unaquaeque habeat esse una. Ac per hoc, quia ex quo res habet esse, una est : ideo 
motus omnium substantiarum est ad unum et propter unum ; et nihil eorum, quae sunt, appetit 
esse multa, sed omnia, sicut appetunt esse, sic et unum esse. Quia enim omnia esse naturaliter 
appetunt, habere autem esse non possunt, nisi sint unum, ideo omnia ad unum tendunt. Unitas 
enim est, quae unit omnia et retinet omnia diffusa in omnibus, quae sunt ».
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Matter, though, is not the same everywhere. In its separation from its cause, 
that is, from God, matter suffers a kind of thickness and differentiation. Where it 
is closer to its cause, matter is subtle and simple, and unity can join it in a strong 
union, as in the celestial beings, that are indivisible in act and perpetual. In 
other regions of existence, further from its cause, matter is thicker and weaker, 
and unity can hardly keep its union with matter. By this, the lowest things are 
weak in existence, and they suffer generation and corruption51. Gundissalinus 
presents this dynamic of ontological degradation through the metaphors of 
the water that descends from its spring and becomes obscure and thick in the 
marshes and ponds ; and that of the light that is weakened in its separation from 
the source of light, the latter referred to the progressive weakening of unity in 
its union with matter 52.
This ontogonic dynamic explains the cosmological progression of the 
hypostases through various hylomorphic unions. Gundissalinus presents the 
same progression expounded by Ibn Gabirol in his Fons vitae. The first created 
being is the Intelligence, whose matter and form are simple and essentially 
indivisible. This unity is multiplied in the Soul, which suffers a certain degree of 
change and diversity, and then, through a progressive increase of multiplicity 
and change, the progression causes the following hypostases, up to the matter 
sustaining the quantity, the thickest of all matters53. 
The close connection between Gundissalinus’s De unitate and Ibn Gabirol’s Fons 
vitae is evident : the treatment of the metaphysical value of unity, as well as the 
overall description of the ontological composition and cosmological derivation, 
are derived from Ibn Gabirol, to which could be added only a few further sources, 
with a minor impact on Gundissalinus’s discussion. Both Gabirolian theories 
51 Ibid., pp. 6, 26 - 7, 6 : « Quae quia a prima unitate remotissima est, ideo spissa et corpulenta et 
constricta est et propter spissitudinem et grossitudinem suam opposita est substantiae superiori, 
quae est subtilis et simplex, quoniam illa est subiectum principii et initii unitatis, haec vero est 
subiectum finis et extremitatis unitatis. Finis vero multum distat a principio, quoniam finis non 
est dictus nisi defectus virtutis et terminus ».
52 Cf. ibid., p. 7, 6-16.
53 Ibid., p. 6, 14-26 : « Et ob hoc unitas, quae duxit ad esse materiam intelligentiae, est magis 
una et simplex, non multiplex nec divisibilis essentialiter ; sed si divisibilis est, hoc siquidem 
accidentaliter est ; et ideo haec unitas simplicior et magis una est omnibus unitatibus, quae ducunt 
ad esse ceteras substantias, eo quod immediate cohaeret primae unitati, quae creavit eam. Sed 
quia unitas subsistens in materia intelligentiae est unitas simplicitatis, ideo necessario unitas 
subsistens in materia animae, quia infra eam est, crescit et multiplicatur et accidit ei mutatio et 
diversitas, et sic paulatim descendendo a superiore per unumquemque gradum materiae inferior 
unitas augetur et multiplicatur, quousque pervenitur ad materiam, quae sustinet quantitatem, 
scilicet substantiam huius mundi ».
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are assimilated by Gundissalinus in a quite ingenuous, non-problematised 
way. Universal hylomorphism, the basis of which is that every created being is 
composed of matter and form, is presented through an apparently quite simple 
dynamic : every being is derived by the union of matter and form/unity, and 
through the progressive separation from their cause, matter degenerates and 
becomes thick, while form/unity becomes weaker in its unitive ontogonic action 
upon matter. This dynamic, derived by Ibn Gabirol, suffers a certain degree of 
simplification in the De unitate. Nonetheless, Gundissalinus cannot avoid falling 
into the problematic implications of the hylomorphic theory presented in the 
Fons vitae : the problem of the multiplication of matter, the circularity of matter 
and form54, and the non-intrinsic functional determination of the hylomorphic 
components implied by the latter55. Problematic cores that are developed 
by both Gundissalinus and Ibn Gabirol through the doctrine of the plurality 
of substantial forms which accompany the first union of matter and unity, 
specifying the compound. 
At the same time, the De unitate offers an early and possibly ingenuous reception 
of Ibn Gabirol’s cosmology, presented through the hypostatical progression 
54 This Gabirolian theory, for which what is form of the upper degree of reality is matter of the 
lower degree of existence, seems to be accepted by Gundissalinus in the De unitate, for the references 
to a multiplicity of matters (ibid., p. 7, 12-14 : « Nam quia aliquid materiae est spirituale et aliquid 
eius corporale, est aliquid eius purum et lucidum et aliquid eius est spissum et obscurum... ») and 
to Ibn Gabirol’s ‘matter sustaining quantity’ (ibid., p. 6, 23-26 : « ...et sic paulatim descendendo a 
superiore per unumquemque gradum materiae inferior unitas augetur et multiplicatur, quousque 
pervenitur ad materiam, quae sustinet quantitatem, scilicet substantiam huius mundi »), a 
point directly connected, in the Fons vitae, to the aforementioned theory. In his De anima, almost 
certainly written between the De unitate and the De processione, Gundissalinus accepts and exposes 
the circularity of matter and form, stating that : « Et notandum quia post primam universalem id 
quod est materia posteriorum, forma est priorum et quod est manifestius, forma est occulti, quia 
materia quo propinquior est sensui est similior formae, et ideo fit manifestior propter evidentiam 
formae et occultationem materiae, quamvis sit materia formae sensibilis » (guNdissaliNus, De anima, 
ed. aloNso del real, p. 144, 10-4).
55 Cf. N. PolloNi, Toledan Ontologies : Gundissalinus, Ibn Daud, and the Problems of Gabirolian 
Hylomorphism, in a. Fidora, N. PolloNi eds., Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism : Philosophical and 
Theological Exchanges Between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions, Fidem, Barcelona 
- Roma 2017, pp. 19-49. The functional circularity of the hylomorphic components entails, by a 
logical point of view, the non-intrinsic functional determination of matter and form. Indeed, by 
stating that the form of the upper level is the matter of the lower, Ibn Gabirol implicitly determines 
both matter and form through the external function they serve and not by an intrinsic logical 
determination of their being. In this way, one should talk about material and formal functions 
rather than talk about matter and form, since a being x is said to be matter only when it serves 
the function of matter, and the very same being x is said to be form when it serves the function of 
form. And in a strict Gabirolian perspective, these functions are basically the material function of 
bearing the form, and the formal function of being borne by matter.
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from the Intelligence to the Soul, Nature, the matter sustaining quantity and, 
then, the corporeal bodies. This cosmological description is grounded on Ibn 
Gabirol’s hylomorphic theory and, in particular, on the functional circularity 
of matter and form he expounds. A progressive problematisation of the latter, 
then, would entail for the Toledan philosopher a reassessment of his cosmology.
Gundissalinus’s perspective in the De processione mundi has changed, 
profoundly. Both the De unitate and the De processione aim at resolving one crucial 
problem : that of the ontological difference between Creator and creature, that 
is, the explanation of how the caused being is similar but substantially different 
from its cause. Gundissalinus’s radical change of perspective is due to his final 
encounter with Avicenna’s metaphysics. With the De processione, Gundissalinus 
displays a profound interest in and knowledge of Avicenna’s theories, even 
though he has no hesitation is passing over in silence many fundamental doctrinal 
points he does not accept, beginning with Avicenna’s ‘limited’ hylomorphism.
The origins of Gundissalinus’s abrupt change in his position should probably 
be found in the influence his collaborator, Abraham ibn Daud, had on him. 
Ibn Daud was a learned Jewish philosopher, and his reflection on the issue is 
extremely close to Avicenna and al-Ġazālī’s Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa56. At the very 
same time, Ibn Daud is possibly the most strenuous critic of Ibn Gabirol’s Fons 
vitae — especially of his universal hylomorphism —, and Ibn Daud attacks him 
throughout his ha-Emunah ha-ramah57. It would have been quite surprising if 
56 See r. FoNtaiNe, In Defense of Judaism : Abraham Ibn Daud. Sources and Structure of ha-Emunah ha-
Ramah, Van Gorcum, Assen- Maastricht 1990 ; and ead., Abraham Ibn Daud : Sources and Structures of 
ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, « Zutot », 2, 2002, pp. 156-163.
57 See, for instance, abraHaM ibN daud, ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, ed. N. M. saMuelsoN, The Exalted 
Faith, by Abraham Ibn Daud, Fairleigh Dickinson, London - Toronto 1986, pp. 40, 4b19 - 41, 5b11 : 
« Also, we understood the treatise of Rabbi Solomon ibn Gabirol, may he be remembered for 
a blessing, in which he aimed at bestowing benefit from philosophy for the same purpose. 
And he did not single out the nation [of Israel] alone [for benefit]. Rather, all finds of people 
are associated together by him in [this] matter [for benefit]. Despite this [notable intention] 
he introduced many words about one subject, so that [with regards to] his treatise to which 
we alluded, which is called The Source of Life, perhaps if its content were refined, his words 
could be included in [a treatise that is] less than one tenth of that treatise. Furthermore, he 
made use of syllogisms without being meticulous [to discover whether it is the case] that 
their premises are true. Whereas according to his view imaginary premises in the forms of 
a true syllogism are satisfactory, certainly their content is doubtful. Since he imagined that 
he could introduce a demonstration when [demonstrations] could not be introduced, he 
multiplied demonstrations, thinking that many demonstrations that are not true can stand 
in the place of one true demonstration. [...] I would not deprecate his words were it not [for 
the fact] that he spoke [what is] a great perversion against the nation. Whoever understood 
his treatise knows [this]. All of that treatise shows the weakness of his grade in philosophy, 
and he gropes in it like groping in the dark ».
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the opposed views of these two philosophers and collaborators, Ibn Daud and 
Gundissalinus, did not have any kind of reciprocal influence. It is possible to 
interpret Gundissalius’s De processione mundi as a kind of response to Ibn Daud’s 
criticism against the ontological perspective backed by Gundissalinus in his De 
unitate (and De anima)58.
The De processione mundi is a curious application of the ‘metaphysical 
procedure’ presented by Gundissalinus in his De divisione philosophiae, and 
derived from al-Fārābī59. For this reason, the treatise has a twofold progression : 
an ascendant part, demonstrating the existence and ontological characteristics 
of God, and a descendant part, discussing the ontological composition of the 
created being and the creation of the world.
The human being has the necessary intellectual powers to know the ‘invisible 
aspects’ of God (invisibilia Dei) through the examination of the created beings : 
their composition, disposition, and cause60. And indeed, through four proofs 
considering the opposed properties of the elements and the hylomorphic 
component — which entail an external composing cause — and examining the 
phenomena of generation and corruption, and potency and act — which imply 
an external efficient cause —, one has to admit the existence of a first Cause of 
the world61. God is, then, the efficient cause of everything, the prime mover that, 
echoing Boethius, « est prima et simplex causa, quae, cum sit immota, cunctis 
58 See PolloNi, Glimpses of the Invisible cit.
59 See N. PolloNi, Gundissalinus’s Application of al-Fārābi’s Metaphysical Programme. A Case of 
Epistemological Transfer, « Mediterranea. International Journal on the Transfer of Knowledge », 1, 
2016, pp. 69-106.
60 Cf. guNdissaliNus, De processione mundi, ed. bülow, p. 2, 4-9.
61 The existence of God as first cause is established through four demonstrations. The first proof 
of the existence of God is centred on the elements. Every sensible being is composed of elements, 
but some of them are characterised by their movement downward, others by a movement upwards. 
Thus, it the existence of a cause composing their contrariety is necessary, and that composer of 
contrariety is the first cause. The second demonstration is focused on hylomorphic composition. 
Every corporeal being is composed of matter and form, but these components have opposed 
properties, contrary to each other. Therefore, an external cause composing them is necessary. 
The third proof considers generation and corruption : every composed thing is resolved into 
what composed it, and comes to be through what composed it. Nonetheless, it is impossible that 
something begins to be by itself : on the contrary, an external cause is always required to produce 
the existence of what is possible, and the inexistence of what is impossible. Finally, the fourth and 
final proof is based on the movement through potency and act. Since the passage from potency to 
act is a kind of movement, one must suppose the existence of a mover which acts as the efficient 
cause of that being, since nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. Therefore, there must be an 
external efficient cause and, avoiding a regress to infinite, one must admit the existence of an 
efficient cause of every caused being. Cf. ibid., pp. 3, 11 - 5, 14.
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aliis movendi est causa. Unde dicitur stabilis, quia manens dat cuncta moveri »62. 
The immobility, that is, immutability of the first cause implies its perfection, 
and his complete and perfect actualization. Indeed, Gundissalinus says, if God 
would move, that movement would be finalized to the reception of a perfection 
of which he would be lacking, and thus, to the actualisation of a potentiality not 
actualised in him. This is inadmissible : God is the unmoved cause of movement, 
constantly identical to itself, and therefore opposed to its effect in which any 
movement and any distinctions reside63. 
This consideration of God as self-sufficient leads to the fundamental 
characterisation of the first cause that Gundissalinus presents in his De processione 
mundi. This is the first pillar upon which Gundissalinus’s overall metaphysical 
reflection is based in this writing, and constitute the crucial point of advance in 
comparison to his previous positions. This pivotal point is the characterisation 
of God as necessary Existent, and thus, Gundissalinus’s adhesion to Avicenna’s 
modal ontology and its distinction between possible and necessary being. The 
possible being is what can be but always requires a cause of its existence, for 
nothing can be the efficient cause of itself. This cause is the necessary being, or 
necessary Existent, uncaused cause of everything, which resolve the structural 
ontological ambiguity of the possible being, that can either be and not be, causing 
its existence. In this way, the possible being becomes a mediated necessary 
being, a necesse esse per aliud, that is, thanks to its cause64. 
In Avicenna’s discussion, the doctrine of necessary and possible being is 
insolubly bound to the crucial distinction between essence and existence, and the 
inapplicability of such distinction to the necessary existent. This fundamental 
theory, which would be crucial for subsequent medieval philosophers, is 
completely absent from Gundissalinus’s discussion, who eagerly accepts the 
theory of necessary and possible being, but passes over in silence Avicenna’s 
distinction between essence and existence, among many other doctrines 
exposed in the Philosophia prima.
62 Ibid., p. 17, 13-15.
63 Ibid., pp. 18, 25 - 19, 1 : « Restat ergo, quod aliquid sit primum principium, quod nullo modo 
moveatur ; et hoc est id, quod dicitur deus. Unde omnis motus est alienus ab essentia eius. Omnis 
vero motus est in opere eius, quemadmodum virtus in auctore quidem semper eadem componens 
et resolvens ».
64 Among the many studies on Avicenna’s ontology, see a. bertolaCCi, The Distinction of Essence 
and Existence in Avicenna’s Metaphysics : The Text and Its Context, in F. oPwis, d. C. reisMaN eds., Islamic 
Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion : Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas, Brill, Leiden 2012, pp. 
257-288 ; o. lizziNi, Wuǧūd-Mawǧūd/Existence-Existent in Avicenna. A Key Ontological Notion of Arabic 
Philosophy’, « Quaestio », 3, 2003, pp. 111-138 ; and r. wisNoVsKy, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context, 
Cornell University Press, Itacha 2003.
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Gundissalinus presents Avicenna’s modal ontology through the quotation 
from chapters six and seven of the first book of Avicenna’s Liber de philosophia 
prima mentioned above. Through this quotation, Gundissalinus expounds the 
five proofs of the unrelated Uniqueness and Oneness of the necessary Existent. 
Thanks to these demonstrations, and again, quoting Avicenna, Gundissalinus 
can finally state the fundamental ontological attributes of God :
« Constat ergo, quod necesse esse neque est relativum, neque est mutabile, nec 
multiplex, sed solitarium, cum nihil aliud participat in suo esse, quod est ei 
proprium ; et hoc non est nisi solus deus, qui est prima causa et primum principium 
omnium, quod unum tantum necesse est intelligi, non duo vel plura »65.
With the description of God as necessary Existent, Gundissalinus completes 
the first part of the Farabian metaphysical procedure he is applying. Following 
this scheme, he now re-descends to the analysis of the created being after 
having acquired a new perspective through which it will now be possible to 
analyse the visible creation. What Gundissalinus has gained from the first part 
of his discussion is quite simple : it is the position of the ontological difference 
between Creator and creatures in the terms of composed vs. composer ; cause 
vs. caused ; and possible vs. necessary being. Besides the very demonstrations 
of God’s unrelated uniqueness, the core of Gundissalinus’s exposition is the 
ontological difference between possibile esse, necesse esse per se, and necesse esse 
per aliud. And if this is the first pillar upon which Gundissalinus’s reflection is 
based, the second one is certainly the universal hylomorphism.
Gundissalinus dedicates dense pages to the discussion of how matter and 
form are the ontological constituents of every caused being66. Nonetheless, the 
universal hylomorphism presented in the De processione mundi is very different 
from what Gundissalinus expounds in his De unitate and De anima. The De 
processione, indeed, offers a polished, problematized, and developed version of 
universal hylomorphism, possibly not less marked by some implicit problems, 
but all the same Gundissalinus’s desire to improve his ontology is patent. This 
desire is pursued through the theoretical merging between Avicenna’s and Ibn 
Gabirol’s ontologies.
Gundissalinus’s line of reasoning is quite simple. In the first place, he claims 
that the ontological difference between God and creature is primarily expressed 
65 guNdissaliNus, De processione mundi, ed. bülow, pp. 16, 23 - 17, 1.
66 Cf. Ibid., pp. 17, 11 - 36, 8.
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by the cause-caused and necessary-possible dynamic. Following Avicenna, 
Gundissalinus states that the possible being is always caused. And since any 
causative process is always the actualization of a potency, therefore, the 
possible being is the very being in potency, while the necessary being per aliud is 
the actualisation of that potency, and the necessary being per se is the efficient 
cause, the act without previous potency presented by Thierry of Chartres67. At 
the same time, Gundissalinus could easily find in Avicenna, al-Ġazālī, and Ibn 
Daud, the assertion by which every possible being is characterised by a structural 
ontological duality : the duality of essence and existence and, correlated to this, 
the duality made of its own ontological possibility and the necessity received from 
its cause. Gundissalinus takes inspiration from this doctrinal point, but chooses 
to replace this duality with another kind of structure : universal hylomorphism. 
It is not by chance that Gundissalinus presents God as the composing and 
efficient cause in the four proofs of God’s existence at the beginning of the De 
processione mundi. Indeed, they are two aspects of one causative process : it is 
by composing matter and form that God causes the actual being, that is, the 
existence of any single thing. It is through the union of matter and form, both 
characterised by a potential being, that the two hylomorphic components and 
their compound receive actual being. For undissalinus, matter and form are, 
indeed, the ontological structure of the possible being, and thanks to their 
union, the compound is actualised and becomes a mediated necessary being, a 
necesse esse per aliud. 
Gundissalinus’s approach might easily be criticised as simplistic and 
ingenuous. His violent appropriation of Avicenna’s doctrines and their fusion 
with Ibn Gabirol’s, ignoring Avicenna’s denial of any universal hylomorphism 
might also be remarked upon. Gundissalinus, nonetheless, is trying to resolve a 
specific question, and in doing this, he probably thought to be consistent with 
the tradition. On the one hand, Gundissalinus is facing the unsolved problem of 
the composition of spiritual substances discussed by Thierry of Chartres. On the 
other hand, he could find in al-Ġazālī’s Summa theoricae philosophiae — translated 
by Gundissalinus himself — and in Ibn Daud’s speculation some support for his 
theories, or at least recognise that they shared a common ground with him. 
In his summary of Avicenna’s philosophy, indeed, al-Ġazālī, explicitly bonds 
the structural duality of the possible being to hylomorphism, stating that its 
possibility is like matter and its necessity is like form, in a discussion implicitly 
67 See PolloNi, Thierry of Chartres and Gundissalinus on Spiritual Substance cit.
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based on the comparison between matter and potency, and form and act68. This 
position is very similar to that presented in Ibn Daud’s ha-Emunah ha-ramah, 
where the Jewish philosopher not only presents the compositions of spiritual 
substances as analogue to hylomorphism, but he specifically connects this point 
to the ‘mistakes’ made by Ibn Gabirol — and, following him, by Gundissalinus69. 
Gundissalinus tries to resolve the ambiguous status of spiritual substance 
through the simple admission that matter does not imply any corporeality for 
the composed being, but only possibility. This de-corporealisation of the effect 
matter has on hylomorphic being allows him to abandon the position stating a 
similarity of the structural duality of spiritual substance to matter and form, 
and claims that that duality is truly made of matter and form. Is this sufficient 
to resolve the oppositions, tensions, and unanswered problems deriving from 
the fusion between Avicenna’s and Ibn Gabirol’s ontologies in the De processione 
mundi ? The answer is no : on the contrary, Gundissalinus’s treatise is crammed 
with unexplained points and doctrinal strains, and possibly this is what makes 
the De processione mundi so fascinating in Gundissalinus’s curious attempt. 
The encounter with Avicenna and his ‘commentators’ — al-Ġazālī and Ibn Daud 
—, is significant for Gundissalinus. Indeed, the theory of modal ontology expounded 
in the Liber de philosophia prima gives him a way to improve his interpretation of 
universal hylomorphism, and a new centre upon which he could ground his 
68 See al-Ġazālī, Summa theoricae philosophiae, ed. J. T. MuCKle, Algazel’s Metaphysics. A medieval 
translation, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto 1933, p. 120, 9-23 : « Omne vero esse 
quod non est necesse esse, est accidentale quiditati. Unde opus est quiditate ad hoc ut esse sit 
ei accidentale. Igitur secundum consideracionem quiditatis erit possibile essendi, et secundum 
consideracionem cause, erit necesse essendi eo quod ostensum est quod quicquid possibile est 
in se, necesse est propter aliud a se ; habet igitur duo iudicia scilicet, necessitatem uno modo, et 
possibilitatem alio modo. Ipsum igitur secundum quod est possibile, est in potencia, et secundum 
quod est necesse, est in effectu ; possibilitas vero est ei ex se, et necessitas ex alio a se ; est igitur in 
eo multitudo unius quidem quod est simile materie et alterius quod est simile forme. Quod autem 
est simile materie est possibilitas, et quod est simile forme est necessitas, que est ei ex alio a se ».
69 See abraHaM ibN daud, Emunah ramah, ed. saMuelsoN, p. 174, 152b14-153a9 : « Rather, the 
dependence of the intellect’s existence on something else indicates that it does not have in itself 
what is necessary of existence. Rather, it has what is possible of existence. Thus, in its substance 
there is what is complex for the intellect and it is like a composite of matter and form. The reason 
for this is that what it has from its substance is like matter, that is, possibility, and what it has 
from something else is like form. The thing that it contains is what it is, that is, necessity. Of the 
many substances that contain this attribute, some are ordered by others of them in order. They 
are the entities for whom ibn Gabirol, may he be remembered for a blessing, tried to establish the 
existence of hyle and form in the fifth book of his treatise. He did not explain what they have is 
something like hyle and something like form. Rather, he ordained that they have matter and form, 
and when he tried to establish this, he could not [do it] ».
SI
SM
EL
. E
DI
ZI
O
N
I D
EL
 G
AL
LU
ZZ
O
nicola polloni538
problematization of the ontological difference between God and creation. This 
‘departure’ from Ibn Gabirol and the most problematic points of his ontology 
previously accepted by Gundissalinus, is further displayed by the abandonment 
of the cosmological progression presented in the Fons vitae and accepted in the De 
unitate. Now, Gundissalinus offers a different description of the cosmic establishment, 
merging together Hermann of Carinthia, Ibn Gabirol, and Ibn Daud70, in a discussion 
where Avicenna’s influence is still pervasive, even though not so evident71.
A very similar scenario is offered by the comparison between Gundissalinus’s 
De scientiis and De divisione philosophiae, even though in this case the stylistic 
70 Gundissalinus’s description of the cosmic establishment is quite peculiar, and bound 
to Avicenna and Ibn Gabirol, on the one hand, and Hermann of Carinthia’s description of the 
cosmogonic causality, on the other hand. The creation of the world corresponds to the very 
creation of matter and form. Both the ontological constituents are eternally present in God’s 
Wisdom and Essence, but their own potential being is actualised through their union in the first 
compound. This process is logically divided into two moments : the creation of matter and form, 
that is, their coming to be, and their union, that is the primaria compositio or first composition. 
While matter is only one in number, there is a plurality of forms joining matter. The first of these 
forms are the form of unity and that of substantiality, and their union with matter gives a sort 
of unspecified substance that, in a second logical moment, receives the forms of spirituality and 
corporeality, that cause the spiritual and corporeal substance. All this process is the primaria 
compositio, and the outcomes of this causal dynamic are three first species of creatures, called 
primaria genitura, that are caused directly by God and, thus, are perpetual : the angelic creatures, 
the celestial spheres, and the elements. One should notice that the distinction between creatio and 
primaria compositio is only (onto-)logical (i.e., ‘analytical’, as opposed to the ‘realist’ interpretation 
of the following degrees of cosmic causation whose description is referred to the existence of 
actual beings). Indeed, matter and form have an actual being only in the hylomorphic compound, 
and Gundissalinus clearly claims that the first actual being is the three species of the primaria 
genitura, caused by the dynamic of material information by the first forms called primaria 
compositio. The primaria genitura performs the secondary causation in the cosmic establishment. 
Indeed, the angels move the celestial spheres and daily create new souls. The spheres, through 
their movement, create the mixtures of which the sublunary bodies are composed. And finally, 
the elements, or better, the force which orders them, that is, nature, operate the alterations of 
the corporeal beings. Thanks to this interdependent dynamic, the primaria genitura performs the 
secundaria compositio and the generatio of all the following beings, characterised by a temporal 
duration marked by generation and corruption.
71 Avicenna’s cosmology seems to have a direct influence on Gundissalinus. On the one hand, 
indeed, some textual passages display that Gundissalinus relies in the Liber de philosophia prima 
regarding the causative action performed by the separate substances or intelligences, as one can 
easily notice in De processione mundi, p. 54, 19-24, where Gundissalinus states : « Quia igitur ex prima 
materiae et formae copula trina suboles progenita est, scilicet intelligentia et caelestia corpora 
et quattuor elementa, ita prima causa omnia movet, sed diverso modo. Quaedam enim movet per 
se nullo mediante et quaedam non per se, sed mediantibus aliis. Principaliter enim per se nullo 
mediante intelligentiam movet ». On the other hand, this causal dynamic is not made explicit by 
Gundissalinus whom, regarding this point, seems to be unclear. Cf. PolloNi, Glimpses of the Invisible cit.
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peculiarities of the former make the analysis more complicated72. The articulation 
of sciences proposed by the De scientiis can be seen as an update of the traditional 
Latin articulation of knowledge. The treatise offers the discussion of five groups 
of disciplines, beginning with grammar73, then logic74, mathematics75, natural 
philosophy and metaphysics76, and finally some disciplines of practical philosophy77 
(politics and juridical science). All these sciences have a sub-articulation in 
disciplines, regarding which Gundissalinus follows al-Fārābī’s discussion. In 
this way, the Toledan philosopher integrates into the articulation of knowledge 
some ‘new’ sciences, as the scientia de aspectibus78, that is, optics, or the scientia de 
ingeniis79, that is, the ‘science of ingeniousness’ or engineering. Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive and persuasive scheme of the inter-relations of these sciences and 
disciplines to each other is missing, and Gundissalinus’s explanation is eventually 
resolved into a list of disciplines rather than into an organic system of knowledge.
This system would be accomplished in the De divisione philosophiae. Here, the 
number of sources used rises noticeably, through references to Avicenna (Liber 
de Philosophia prima and Logica), al-Ġazālī (Metaphysica and Logica), the Brethren 
of Purity (Liber introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis), Isaac Israeli (Liber de 
definitionibus), al-Kindī (Liber de quinque essentiis), as well as Cicero (De inventione), 
Bede (Ars metrica), Boethius, Isidore of Seville, Thierry of Chartres, and William 
of Conches80. The number of the sources used by Gundissalinus corresponds 
to the purpose of the De divisione philosophiae : providing the Latin world with 
a meta-encyclopaedic system that could allow the introduction of the ‘new’ 
sciences in the Latin articulation of knowledge, grounding the latter on the new 
basis provided by Avicenna’s doctrine of subalternatio. 
The system proposed by Gundissalinus is quite complex, especially in 
comparison to the articulation of knowledge presented in the De scientiis. The 
72 As we have seen, the De scientiis is basically a ‘critical translation’ of al-Fārābī’s Kitāb Iḥṣāʾ 
al-ʿUlūm. Regarding the use of further sources, see the introductory study by Alonso Alonso to his 
edition of guNdissaliNus, De scientiis, ed. aloNso aloNso, pp. 7-51.
73 guNdissaliNus, De scientiis, ed. aloNso aloNso, pp. 59, 3 - 65, 2.
74 Ibid., pp. 67, 3 - 83, 3.
75 Ibid., pp. 85, 3 - 112, 6.
76 Ibid., pp. 113, 3 - 131, 15.
77 Ibid., pp. 133, 3 - 140, 6.
78 Ibid., pp. 93, 9 - 99, 4.
79 Ibid., pp. 108, 9 - 112, 6.
80 On Gundissalinus’s sources of the De divisione philosophiae, see a. Fidora, Die Wissenschaftstheorie 
des Dominicus Gundissalinus. Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen des zweiten Anfangs der aristotelischen 
Philosophie im 12. Jahrhunder, De Gruyter,  Berlin 2003.
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first branch of knowledge is eloquence, which correspond to grammar and the 
civil sciences (scientiae civiles), that are poetic and rhetoric. Then, the second 
branch is the scientia intermedia, that is logic or dialectic. Also, logic is structured 
in several sub-disciplines, corresponding to the Aristotelian writings dedicated 
to this discipline plus rhetoric and poetics. Finally, the scientia sapientiae, that 
is philosophy, the art of the arts and the discipline of the disciplines (ars artium 
et disciplina disciplinarum). Philosophy is divided in two or better three parts, 
depending on whether logic is considered a part of philosophy or not : it is the 
traditional distinction in theoretical and practical philosophy81. The latter, that is, 
practical philosophy is composed of politics, economics, and ethics, following the 
traditional Aristotelian articulation. Theoretical philosophy is divided in three 
main sciences, that are physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, distinguished by 
the corporeality and movement of the objects with which they deal.
While the discussion of mathematics is very close to the corresponding part 
of Gundissalinus’s De scientiis82, the description of physics and metaphysics — a 
discipline given this name for the first time in the Latin world83 — offers some 
crucial developments. These are due to Gundissalinus’s acceptance of Avicenna’s 
theory of subalternation, presented in the De divisione philosophiae through 
the large quotation of the aforementioned Summa Avicennae de convenientia et 
differentia scientiarum. Indeed, thanks to this theory, Gundissalinus can finally 
bond together all the disciplines into an organic system of knowledge, of 
which metaphysics or scientia divina is the very root. In fact, all the sciences are 
subordinated to first philosophy, in what is a first approximation to a doctrine 
that will spread throughout Europe in a few decades.
Furthermore, Gundissalinus receives and develops another doctrinal point of 
Avicenna’s theory, with a very practical purpose : the distinction between parts 
of a science — i.e., its internal developments — and its subordinate disciplines. 
Upon this Gundissalinus can indeed integrate into his system of knowledge 
also border-line disciplines, arrived through the Arabic-into-Latin translation 
movement, as subordinated disciplines which are based on but are not parts of 
a given science.
81 Regarding this point, see HugoNNard-roCHe, La classification des sciences de Gundissalinus cit.
82 In the De divisione, as in the De scientiis, mathematic counts seven sciences, that are : 
arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, which are joined to optics (or scientia de aspectibus), the 
science of weight (scientia de ponderibus), and the science of ingeniousness (scientia de ingenii).
83 See a. Fidora, Dominicus Gundissalinus and the Introduction of Metaphysics into the Latin West, 
« The Review of Metaphysics », 66, 2013, pp. 691-712.
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The best example of this theoretical gain is displayed by the consideration 
of natural philosophy. Natural philosophy deals with the body as it is subject to 
movement, rest, and mutation. This science is composed of eight parts, each one 
of them is defined by a book or part of a book of Aristotle (or pseudo-Aristotle) : 
Liber de naturali auditu, Liber caeli et mundi, De generatione et corruptione, the first 
three books of the De impressionibus superioribus (i.e., Metheora), the fourth book 
of the Metheora, De mineralibus, De vegetalibus (or De plantiis), and finally, as for 
the eighth part of natural philosophy, it is described in De animalibus, De anima 
and the remaining Aristotelian books on physics84.
At the same time, while physics is developed in itself through these eights 
parts, it also contains below itself eight subordinated disciplines, and they are : 
medicine, the science of signs (de indiciis), necromancy, agriculture, science of 
images (de imaginibus), navigation, science of mirrors (de speculis) and alchemy85. 
These sciences are not parts of natural philosophy, but are subordinated to 
physics, that is, their object of study is provided by physics. Unfortunately, 
Gundissalinus is extremely meagre in presenting these eight subordinated 
sciences, and some of them are just named and not discussed, as it is the case 
of the science of signs, the science of images, and necromancy. As for alchemy, 
which appears here for the first time as a recognised scientific discipline, 
Gundissalinus simply states that it is the science of the conversion of things into 
other species (‘scientia de conversione rerum in alias species’)86.
What is crucial to notice is how these sciences, and peculiar disciplines such 
as necromancy, alchemy, astrology, or the ‘science of signs’, can be counted 
among the natural disciplines without being part of natural philosophy itself. 
In this way, any question regarding their lawfulness or rightfulness becomes 
secondary : Gundissalinus, here, is not trying to justify these disciplines as 
parts of physics. He is opening an ‘epistemological space’ on which these 
new disciplines, derived from the translation movement, could be inserted 
84 guNdissaliNus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. baur, pp. 20, 20 - 23, 15.
85 Ibid., p. 20, 11-19 : « Sed quia scientiarum aliae sunt universales, aliae particulares, universales 
autem dicuntur, sub quibus multae aliae scientiae continentur, tunc scientia naturalis universalis 
est, quia octo scientiae sub ea continentur : scilicet scientia de medicina, scientia de iudiciis, 
scientia de nigromantia secundum physicam, scientia de imaginibus, scientia de agricultura, 
scientia de navigatione, scientia de speculis, scientia de alquimia, quae est scientia de conversione 
rerum in alias species ; et haec octo sunt species naturalis scientiae ». See, in particular, C. burNett, 
A New Source for Dominicus Gundissalinus’s Account of the Science of the Stars ?, « Annals of Science », 
47, 1990, pp. 361–374. 
86 Ibid., p. 20, 18.
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and grounded87. But this ‘epistemological space’ would have been impossible 
to create without Avicenna’s theory of subalternation, thanks to which these 
border-line disciplines can be connected to physics without being themselves 
parts of physics, with all the epistemological consequences this eventuality 
would have.
Avicenna’s role is both key and pivotal also regarding Gundissalinus’s 
psychological reflection88. Gundissalinus’s De anima deals with the overall 
discussion on the soul, particularly answering the questions on its existence, 
ontological status, immortality, and psychological powers : a discussion posited 
by the Latin tradition of studies on the soul by authors such as Cassiodorus, 
Alcuin, and pseudo-Augustine89. The main difference with the tradition resides 
in the vast number of new sources upon which Gundissalinus’s treatise is based : 
Qusta ibn Luqa’s De differentia spiritus et animae, Ibn Gabirol’s Fons vitae, Avicenna’s 
De anima, together with some Latin authors such as Boethius, Macrobius, Cicero, 
and Augustine, authors that, nonetheless, play a secondary role in the economy 
of Gundissalinus’s text.
By a thematic and comparative point of view, the De anima can be divided 
into two different parts of similar length. The first one, composed of chapters 
1-890, is an analysis of the definition, composition, origin, and immortality of 
the soul, based mainly (but not exclusively) on Ibn Luqa, Avicenna, and Ibn 
Gabirol. The second part (chapters 9 and 1091) is centred on the examination of 
the psychological powers, and relies almost exclusively on Avicenna’s De anima, 
while the final pages present a digression on the ‘psychology of light’92.
In the first place, Gundissalinus demonstrates the existence of the soul 
through the examination of its relation with the body. The soul is indeed the 
87 This ‘epistemological space’ will be closed quite soon, and the fate of many of these sciences 
will be unhappy : apart from some extremely peculiar thinkers, like Roger Bacon, alchemy and 
astrology found little or no space in scholastic philosophy, and Bacon himself will be condemned 
by the Franciscan order in 1278, and his image as a wizard, even furnished with a ‘brazen head’, 
will last until Robert Greene and beyond.
88 The influence of Avicenna’s De anima on Gundissalinus’s psychology has been analysed by 
Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West cit.
89 Cf. guNdissaliNus, De divisione philosophiae, ed. baur, p. 15.
90 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, pp. 68, 3 - 176, 4.
91 Ibid., pp. 178, 3 - 318, 11.
92 See M. J. soto bruNa, La lux intelligentiae agentis en el pensamiento de Domingo Gundisalvo, 
« Revista española de filosofía medieval », 10, 2003, pp. 335-343.
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mover of the body, which moves it while staying put93. As for its definition, 
the soul is an incorporeal substance moving the body and the perfection of the 
physical, organic, and potentially living body, as stated by Plato (the former) 
and Aristotle (the latter).
The soul is an incorporeal simple substance, and nonetheless, it is a compound 
of matter and form. Every created being is made of the two hylomorphic 
compounds, including the angelic creatures and the souls, as Gundissalinus 
demonstrates through the quotation of many of Ibn Gabirol’s proofs from the 
third book of the Fons vitae94. Nonetheless, even if the soul is composed of matter 
and form, this does not entail its complexity. Indeed, the soul can be said to be 
simple in comparison to what follow it in the causative progression of the world95.
The souls are created cotidie : if they had been created at the beginning of 
time, the souls would have been useless without a body to which be joined96. On 
the contrary, the souls are created daily, ex nihilo, and in causative process of 
many souls that do not derive from a single, original soul (against traducianism). 
Nevertheless, the souls are not created directly by God : it is a mediate creation, 
performed by the angelic creatures97. Even though there are three kind of souls 
— vegetative, sensitive, and rational — there is one soul only in every living 
being : indeed, the superior always acts upon the inferior98.
Furthermore, the soul is immortal. The body is not the efficient cause of 
the soul, on the contrary, the body is its accidental cause, and thus, when the 
body dies, its corruption does not affect the soul in any way99. The soul does 
not depend on body — nor the body depends on the soul — and, for this reason, 
since ‘esse enim animae pendet ex aliis principiis quae non permutantur neque 
93 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, pp. 68, 1 - 82, 14.
94 Cf. ibid., pp. 142, 1 - 164, 22.
95 Ibid., pp. 162, 20 - 164, 1 : « Non sunt ergo simplices substantiae immunes ab omni 
compositione ; ac per hoc non dicuntur simplices esse quod omni compositione careant, sed 
quia respectu inferiorum de compositione minus habent, quoniam adhaerentes aeternitati et 
affixae desiderio uni et eidem creatoris voluntati incommutabili, nulli permutationi subiacent, 
affectionem non variant, in eodem statu semper permanent ».
96 Ibid., pp. 124, 3 - 128, 16.
97 Ibid., p. 132,14-18 : « Idem ad recipiendum aliquid ab aliquo, nihil est dignius eo quod illud 
recipit nullo medi ante. Si igitur anima recipit esse a primo factore nullo mediante, tunc nihil 
est dignius ea ad recipiendum illud ab illo ; sed substantia intelligentiae dignior est ad hoc ; ergo 
anima non recipit esse a primo factore nullo mediante ».
98 Ibid., pp. 108, 1 - 122, 4.
99 Ibid., pp. 168, 3 - 170, 7.
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destruuntur... anima non moritur in morte corporis’100. Finally, since there is no 
possible way by which the soul can be destroyed, one has to admit that the soul 
is immortal101.
There is no need to stress how crucial is the role played by Avicenna’s De anima 
in the first part of Gundissalinus’s homonymous writing. It will be sufficient to 
recall that the resolution of the problem of the internal multiplicity or unity of 
the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul102 (joined to Ibn Gabirol’s Neoplatonic 
causal doctrine)103 ; the demonstration of the difference between soul and body 
through the argument of the ‘flying man’104 ; the discussion of the kind of 
movements of the soul105 ; the answer to the problem of the creation of the soul 
ab initio mundi or cotidie106 ; and the overall discussion on the immortality of the 
soul107, are all grounded on Avicenna’s discussion presented in his De anima. In 
Gundissalinus’s psychological treatise, too, one can see at work the theoretical 
merging between Avicenna’s and Ibn Gabirol’s perspective : an unlikely doctrinal 
fusion that is one of the most characteristic feature of Gundissalinus’s reflection.
The role played by Avicenna in Gundissalinus’s De anima is even more central 
in the second part of the treatise. In these closing chapters, Gundissalinus 
expounds the articulation of the vegetative soul108, and that of the sensitive 
faculties into vis motiva and vis apprehensiva, the latter articulated into the 
external and internal faculties, that are, on the one hand, the five senses109 and, 
on the other hand, the five vires : phantasia, imaginatio, imaginativa/cogitativa, 
aestimativa, and memoria, discussed addressing a series of problems derived, 
again, from Avicenna’s homonymous work110. 
100 Ibid., p. 172, 2-4.
101 Ibid., pp. 172, 5 - 176, 4. One should notice that the structure of this argument is mirrored 
by (or mirrors) the De immortalitate animae. This is not the place where one can discuss the many 
problems regarding the authorship of this treatise. Nonetheless, the question about who did write 
the De immortalitate needs to be reassessed considering the new data on Gundissalinus and its 
sources recently made available.
102 aViCeNNa, Liber de anima, ed. VaN riet, V, pp. 105-112.
103 ibN gabirol, Fons vitae, ed. bauMKer, p. 186, 19-23.
104 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, p. 86, 1-17. See also aViCeNNa, Liber de anima, I, ed. 
VaN riet, pp. 36-37.
105 Ibid., I, pp. 45-46.
106 Ibid., V, pp. 115-116.
107 Ibid., V, pp. 117-124.
108 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, pp. 186, 12 - 190, 12.
109 Ibid., pp. 192, 21 - 202, 10.
110 Ibid., pp. 202, 12 - 246, 24.
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Then, Gundissalinus passes to the examination of the intellective process 
offered by Avicenna’s De anima. The focus, then, is on the psychological faculties 
proper to man, ‘agere actiones electione deliberationis et advenire artes 
meditando et comprehendere universalia111’. The intellectual faculties are two : 
the virtus activa112 and the virtus contemplativa113. These two kinds of intellect are 
directed downwards and upwards and, thus, they produce two different kinds 
of knowledge correlated to each other : « sed ex eo quod est infra eam — scilicet 
intellectu activo — generatur mores et scientiae, et ex eo quod est supra eam —
scilicet intellectu contemplativo — acquiruntur sapientiae »114.
Gundissalinus’s attention is centred on the examination of the progressive 
actualization of the contemplative intellect through its states of intellectus materialis, 
in habitu, and intellectus adeptus ab alio115. The Toledan philosopher, in this way, is 
the first Latin philosopher in presenting and discussing Avicenna’s theory of the 
separate active intellect, from which the intellectus adeptus receives its actualisation :
« Qui ideo vocatur intellectus adeptus ab alio quoniam intellectus in potentia non 
exit ad effectum nisi per intellectum qui semper est in effectu. Aliquid igitur est 
per quod animae nostrae in rebus intelligibilibus exeunt de potentia ad effectum. 
Id autem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum 
intelligibilium abstractarum. Unde cum intellectus qui est in potentia coniungitur 
cum illo intellectu qui est in actu aliquo modo coniunctionis, imprimitur in eo 
aliqua species formarum quae est adepta ab extrinsecus »116.
It is through this intellect qui semper est in effectu that the intellectus adeptus can 
receive the principles of the abstract intellective forms, and it joins the intellect 
still in potency impressing upon it the intelligible forms from the consideration 
of what is inferior117. Gundissalinus also accepts the separateness of the active 
111 Ibid., p. 248, 5-6.
112 Ibid., p. 250, 7-11 : « Sed virtus activa sive intellectus activus est principium movens corpus 
hominis ad singulas actiones quas praecipue sibi eligit secundum quod intendit. Sed hoc facit 
aliquando per virtutem animalem appetitivam sive desiderativam, aliquando per imaginativam 
sive aestimativam, aliquando per se ipsam ».
113 Ibid., p. 252, 1-2 : « virtus autem contemplativa sive intellectus contemplativus est qui solet 
informari a forma universali nudata a materia ».
114 Ibid., p. 258, 1-3.
115 Regarding the use Gundissalinus makes of Avicenna on this point, see Hasse, Avicenna’s De 
anima in the Latin West cit., p. 191.
116 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, p. 262, 1-9.
117 Ibid., p. 288, 7-11 : « Quae forma est intellectus adeptus verissime et haec virtus est 
intellectus in effectu secundum quod est perfectio. Formatio vero imaginabilium est respectio 
animae ad thesauros sensibilium. Sed primum est inspicere quod est superius ; hoc autem est 
inspicere quod est inferius ».
SI
SM
EL
. E
DI
ZI
O
N
I D
EL
 G
AL
LU
ZZ
O
nicola polloni546
intellect, and this is made clear by the textual analysis of the De anima, where the 
Toledan philosopher states that :
« Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit 
coniungi intelligentiae agenti et tunc inveniet in ea pulchritudinem intelligibilem 
et delectationem perennem sicut dicemus suo loco »118.
Following Avicenna, this separate intelligence is an angelic creature, as 
Gundissalinus claims a few pages earlier :
« Sicut ergo corpus humanum non recipit actionem aliquam animae rationalis 
nisi mediante spiritu, sic et anima rationalis non recipit actionem factoris primi 
nisi mediante intelligentia, scilicet angelica creatura »119.
The central role played by Avicenna in the overall discussion of Gundissalinus’s 
De anima, thus, is striking. Gundissalinus builds his thematisation of the soul on 
Avicenna’s work, shortening, simplifying, and sometimes amending the original 
discussion of the original De anima. Nonetheless, the final pages of Gundissalinus’s 
writing120 display a peculiar attitude of the Toledan philosopher. The closing 
part of the De anima, indeed, is marked by the disappearance of any Arabic 
source, replaced by a constant reference to the Biblical authority. In just a few 
pages he makes eighteen explicit references to the Bible, in a total of twenty-
one references presented throughout the whole text of the De anima. The focus 
is here centred on the discussion of the metaphor of light, in accordance with 
Augustine’s theory of intellectual illumination.
One of the outcomes of this attitude is that, in these pages, Gundissalinus 
becomes inconsistent in referring to the human intellect121. The term intelligentia 
is now used in a rather different sense than the active intelligence : it is the 
highest faculty of the human being, through which one has sapientia — and 
therefore an immanent faculty rather than a separate principle. For instance, 
Gundissalinus states that : 
118 Ibid., p. 288, 11-14.
119 Ibid., p. 136, 9-12.
120 Ibid., pp. 302, 6 - 318, 11.
121 On the introduction of this and further terms related to the intellective process into the 
Latin philosophical tradition, see J. JoliVet, Intellect et intelligence. Note sur la tradition arabo-latine des 
XIIe et XIIIe siècles’, in s. HosseiN Nasr ed., Mélanges offerts a Henry Corbin, McGill University - Institute 
of Islamic Studies, Tehran 1977, pp. 221-237.
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« Cum enim hic oculus animae qui est intelligentia in contemplationem creatoris 
intendit, quoniam Deus lux est, ipsa intelligentia tanta claritate divini luminis 
perfunditur ut in ipsa intelligentia sic irradiata lux inaccessibilis tamquam forma 
in speculo resultare videatur »122.
Gundissalinus refers with the same term to two different things, an immanent 
faculty and a transcendent being. And, at the very same time, the final pages of 
the De anima appear to be in contradiction with what Gundissalinus claimed in 
his previous discussion, for the explicit references to Augustine’s theories and 
the overall change of perspective presented. 
Nonetheless, the reason of this change of attitude can be explained perhaps 
by a simple consideration. Until the final pages of his De anima, Gundissalinus 
has claimed at least three main doctrines in clear disagreement with the Latin 
Christian tradition : psychological hylomorphism, the angelic creation of the 
soul, and the existence of a separate medium of human intellection. With the 
passage to the discussion of what the soul knows after the death of the body, 
Gundissalinus possibly felt a need to ease the border-line positions he has taken. 
By this point of view, the references to Augustine seem to be aimed at stating 
the implicit consistency between what Gundissalinus has claimed following 
Avicenna, and the Latin tradition : a feature characteristic of Gundissalinus’s 
approach, as underlined by Alexander Fidora regarding Boethius’s and Isidore’s 
role in the De divisione philosophiae123.
soMe CoNClusioNs
Avicenna plays a central role in Gundissalinus’s philosophical production, 
as well in his activity as translator. Gundissalinus probably moved to Toledo 
to participate to the very translation of the Avicennian corpus proposed by Ibn 
Daud. In the following decades, while translating these texts, he would gradually 
discover Avicenna’s doctrines, and this encounter was to be pivotal for his own 
philosophical reflections.
While pervasive, Avicenna’s influence on Gundissalinus’s original writings 
is not balanced or equal. On the contrary, the analysis of Gundissalinus’s 
122 guNdissaliNus, De anima, ed. aloNso del real, p. 304, 1-4.
123 See a. Fidora, La recepción de San Isidoro de Sevilla por Domingo Gundisalvo (ca. 1110-1181) : 
Astronomía, Astrología y Medicina en la Edad Media, « Estudios eclesiásticos », 75, 2000, pp. 663-677 ; 
id., La metodología de las ciencias según Boecio : su recepción en las obras y traducciones de Domingo 
Gundisalvo, « Revista española de filosofía medieval », 7, 2000, pp. 127-136 ; and id., Domingo 
Gundisalvo y la Sagrada Escritura, « Estudios eclesiásticos », 76, 2001, pp. 243-258.
SI
SM
EL
. E
DI
ZI
O
N
I D
EL
 G
AL
LU
ZZ
O
nicola polloni548
philosophical production displays a clear progression on his adhesion to 
Avicenna, whose doctrines appear to play a secondary role in the De unitate et uno 
and, in a different way, in the De scientiis. The second phase of Gundissalinus’s 
speculative activity is then marked by a diffusive presence of Avicenna — both his 
texts and doctrines — with a crucial role in the De anima, De divisione philosophiae, 
and De processione mundi. 
Avicenna is the answer to the problems arising from Gundissalinus’s 
precocious adhesion to Ibn Gabirol’s ontology and cosmology. Possibly 
through Ibn Daud’s criticism, Gundissalinus gradually understands that some 
doctrines derived by the Fons vitae entail problematic outcomes that needed to 
be resolved. The solution Gundissalinus provides to these doctrinal problems 
is the assimilation of Avicenna’s modal ontology, and the attempt he makes at 
merging this theory with universal hylomorphism. 
A similar scenario is offered by the consideration of the De divisione philosophiae 
and De anima. In his epistemological work, Gundissalinus uses Avicenna to 
substantiate an organic and consistent system of knowledge grounded on the 
theory of subalternatio. Gundissalinus’s system is an articulation of sciences in 
which the new disciplines derived by the translation movement could be finally 
inserted, with a substantial change of perspective in comparison, for instance, 
with Hugh of St Victor’s Didascalicon. In a similar fashion, the De anima offers a 
discussion of the soul, and especially of its powers, that, derived by Avicenna, 
would have a crucial history of the effects in the thirteenth-century debate and 
whose first Latin reception was made by Gundissalinus.
Since the impact of Avicenna on Gundissalinus’s speculation is so profound 
and wide, should we refer to the Toledan philosopher as an Avicennist thinker ? 
This is what Albert the Great does in his De homine, regarding Gundissalinus’s 
(and al-Ġazālī’s) positions124. Many decades have passed since the controversy 
between Étienne Gilson and Roland De Vaux on the supposed augustinisme 
avicennisant or Latin Avicennism of Gundissalinus125. While Gilson’s position has 
124 albertus MagNus, De homine, ed. H. aNzulewiCz, Aschendorff, Münster 2008 (Alberti Magni 
Opera Omnia, XXVII/2), p. 410, 25-27.
125 See É. gilsoN, Pourquoi saint-Thomas a critiqué saint-Augustin’, « Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du Moyen Âge », 1, 1926-1927, pp. 5-129 ; id., Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Âge’, 
« Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge », 44, 1969, pp. 89-121 ; id., Les sources 
gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant, « Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen 
Age », 5, 1930, pp. 1-107 ; and r. de Vaux, Notes et texte sur l’avicennisme latin aux confins des XII-XIII 
siècles, Vrin, Paris 1934.
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been rejected by many scholars with eminent arguments based on the very text of 
Gundissalinus’s De anima126, and De Vaux’s reading of the first Latin reception of 
Avicenna suffered a precocious criticism127, it is undeniable that Gundissalinus, 
being the very first Latin philosopher in accepting and developing Avicenna’s 
doctrines, is the initiator of a tendency that would be felt strongly throughout 
the thirteenth century and beyond. 
At the same time, though, there are at least three further considerations 
that have to be done in order to understand the relation between Gundissalinus 
and Avicenna. In the first place, it should be recalled that Avicenna was read by 
Gundissalinus (and Ibn Daud) in explicit consistency with Aristotle. This fact is 
made clear by Gundissalinus’s direct references to Aristotle in his philosophical 
production, under whose name he often quotes excerpts extracted by Avicenna128. 
This attitude — shared by other thinkers in different traditions, such as 
Maimonides129 — is also explicitly presented by Ibn Daud in the dedicatory letter 
of the Latin translation of Avicenna’s De anima, and it would have a discreet 
success in the following decades of the Latin philosophical speculation, when 
Avicenna was used as interpretative mediation for a correct understanding of 
Aristotle’s writings, up to the translations of Averroes’s works130.
A second, fundamental aspect to consider is that Gundissalinus’s progressive 
acceptance of Avicenna’s theories does not imply for him a complete abandonment 
of Ibn Gabirol’s ontology, but only its reassessment. Gundissalinus’s adhesion 
to doctrines completely unacceptable from an Avicennian point of view, as 
displayed by Ibn Daud’s criticism, makes it hard to claim that Gundissalinus was 
a convinced Avicennist, as was certainly the case for Ibn Daud. 
This point is directly linked to a third point. Gundissalinus’s reception of 
Avicenna is partial : he enacts a sort of ‘cherry-picking’ upon the Avicennian 
126 See, in particular, J. JoliVet, The Arabic Inheritance, in P. droNKe ed., A History of Twelfth-Century 
Western Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 113-148. 
127 See e. bertola, È esistito un avicennismo latino nel Medioevo ?, « Sophia », 35, 1967, pp. 318-334, 
and 39, 1971, pp. 278-320.
128 See PolloNi, Aristotle in Toledo : Gundissalinus, the Arabs, and Gerard of Cremona’s Translations cit.
129 See J. sterN, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
- London 2013.
130 See a. bertolaCCi, On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus : An 
Attempt at Periodization, in a. bertolaCCi, d. N. Hasse eds., The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of 
Avicenna’s Metaphysics, De Gruyter, Berlin 2012, pp. 197-223. See also a. bertolaCCi, The Reception of 
Avicenna in Latin Medieval Culture, in P. adaMsoN ed., Interpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2013, pp. 242-269.
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writings he had at his disposal, choosing only those theories that he felt as 
relevant and leaving apart a vast amount of correlated doctrinal points he did 
not perceive as important or, perhaps, he did not even understand. A clear 
example of this is the silence under which Avicenna’s distinction between 
essence and existence is passed by Gundissalinus. However, it is also of the 
utmost importance to note the ‘hermeneutical violence’ that characterises 
Gundissalinus’s attitude toward Avicenna’s hylomorphism, completely rejected 
without presenting, in his original writings, any moment of actual confrontation 
with Avicenna’s positions. This is possibly the most relevant aspect regarding 
the supposed Avicennism of Gundissalinus. The complete lack of any dialogue 
with Avicenna, also in his later writings, seems to mark Gundissalinus’s use of 
Avicenna as still immature and even ingenuous, especially in comparison to the 
subsequent Latin reception of Avicenna. 
Despite this, Avicenna plays a central, crucial role for Gundissalinus. Even if 
he is quoted by name only in a quite few occasions, the overall reflection of the 
Toledan philosopher is grounded on Avicenna’s texts, and insolubly bound to 
them. From this perspective, Avicenna’s founding presence is quite symmetrical 
to the influence his writings have on two further anonymous works written 
in the same decades as Gundissalinus’s : the De peregrinationibus animae apud 
inferos131, or ‘Anonymous d’Alverny’, and the Liber de causis primis et secundis132. 
A. Bertolacci referred to Gundissalinus and these two writings as witnesses 
of this first stage of the Latin reception of Avicenna, called ‘Philosophia prima 
without Metaphysica’, stressing the autonomy the references to Avicenna have as 
regards to Aristotle’s Metaphysics133. 
These writings share a common purpose : they are aimed at facilitating the 
insertion of new ideas, new authors, and new doctrinal perspectives into a 
philosophical debate that was still based on the framework furnished by Plato’s 
Timaeus, Chartrean natural philosophy and Parisian dialectic. They try to justify the 
new doctrines from ‘the Arabs’ displaying their consistency with the Latin tradition, 
as it is in place with Gundissalinus’s use of Boethius, Augustine, and the Chartrean 
speculation ; the De causis primis et secundis attempting a synthesis between Avicenna 
131 aN., De peregrinationibus animae apud inferos, ed. M.-t. d’alVerNy, Les pérégrinations de l’âme 
dans l’autre monde d’après un anonyme de la fine du XIIe siècle, « Archives d’histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du Moyen Âge », 13, 1940-1942, pp. 280-299.
132 aN., Liber de causis primis et secundis, ed. de Vaux, Notes et teste sur l’avicennisme latin aux 
confins des XII-XIII siècles cit., pp. 83-140.
133 bertolaCCi, On the Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics before Albertus Magnus : An Attempt 
at Periodization cit.
SI
SM
EL
. E
DI
ZI
O
N
I D
EL
 G
AL
LU
ZZ
O
gundissalinus and avicenna 551
and Scotus Eriugena ; and the Peregrinatio, where the author inserts many Arabic 
doctrines in a Christian eschatological description of the afterlife. 
It is exactly in this pioneering role they are playing that these treatises and 
authors display their fundamental relevance. Indeed, their perhaps ingenuous 
approach is caused by their lack of that process of progressive absorption 
and critical elaboration of the Arabic sources, and they lack all this exactly 
for they are the pioneers of this philosophical process that would lead, in a 
few decades, to the mature confrontations with Avicenna of thinkers such 
as Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, or Roger Bacon. It is this that makes of 
Gundissalinus one of the pivotal figures in the history of Western philosophy, 
since his curiosity, syncretism and eagerness, contributed crucially to the road 
that led, philosophically, Avicenna to Paris, where his thought will be duly 
problematized, developed, and criticised.
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ABSTRACT
Gundissalinus and Avicenna : Some Remarks on an Intricate Philosophical Connection
This article analyses the peculiarities of Dominicus Gundissalinus’s reading and use 
of Avicenna’s writings in his original works. Gundissalinus (1120ca - post 1190) is indeed 
the Latin translator of Avicenna’s De anima and Liber de philosophia prima, but also an 
original philosopher whose writings are precious witnesses of the very first reception 
of Avicennian philosophy in the Latin West. The article points out the structural bond 
with the Persian philosopher upon which Gundissalinus grounds his own speculation. 
This contribution stresses, in particular, the important role played by Avicenna’s 
psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics in order to provide Gundissalinus with a 
different set of answers to at least two main questions. On the one hand, the problem of 
creatural existence and cosmological causation, concerning which Gundissalinus tends 
to doctrinally merge Avicenna with Ibn Gabirol. On the other hand, Avicenna’s influence 
is crucial for Gundissalinus’s attempt at elaborating a new system of knowledge, which 
was supposed to be able to include the new sciences made available by the translation 
movement, but that also needed to be internally organised through firm epistemological 
principles. Beside his crucial contribution as translator, Gundissalinus’s first 
philosophical encounter with the Avicenna paved the road for the subsequent reception 
of the Persian philosopher’s works, opening a hermeneutical perspective which would 
be pivotal for the thirteenth-century discussions on soul, knowledge, and being. 
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